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Abstract 
The purpose of the current study was to examine cognitive distortions as a mediator 
between maladaptive schema and hopelessness.  With hopelessness and suicidal 
behavior so strongly correlated, an examination of hopelessness is critical.  It was 
expected that this study would shed light on the role of distorted thinking as it 
relates to beliefs shaped from early maladaptive experiences and hopelessness.  
First, distorted thinking was not found to partially mediate the relationship between 
early maladaptive schema and hopelessness.  This was likely a consequence of 
multicollinearity due to the use of a very proximal mediator.  Second, a linear 
combination of the cognitive distortions Magnification, Fortune-Telling, and 
Jumping to Conclusions was shown to play a significant role in hopeless thinking.  
Lastly, this study provided further psychometric support for the Inventory of Cognitive 
Distortions (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2002).    
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
Approximately 105 suicides occur in the United States each day, which is about 
one suicide every .07 minutes.  Since 2000, annual suicide rates have steadily increased 
from 29,350 to 38,364 in 2010.  These statistics make suicide the tenth leading cause of 
death overall.  Additionally, for every completed suicide, approximately six people are 
personally affected (e.g., friends, family members; American Association of Suicidology, 
2010).   
Given the tremendous toll that suicide takes on patients, family, and the 
community, the identification of epidemiologic, as well as cognitive, behavioral, and 
environmental risk factors for suicide will enable psychologists to develop more effective 
preventions and interventions.  Current research suggests that more than 90% of those 
who attempt or complete suicide have one or more mental illnesses.  At particular risk are 
those individuals who suffer from depression (Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Henriksson et 
al., 1993).  The presence of depression has been shown to increase the probability of 
completed suicide by 50% (American Foundation for Suicide Prevention, 2008).  Though 
depression is a particularly strong risk factor in suicidal behavior, hopelessness, a 
cognitive risk factor, has been identified as a strong warning sign in individuals who 
complete suicide (Beck & Weishaar, 1990).   
  Hopelessness is defined as a future-oriented state of negative expectation in 
which the individual with hopelessness believes (a) positive outcomes will not occur, (b) 
negative outcomes will occur, and (c) the individual is helpless to affect the negative 
outcome of events (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989).  Researchers have 
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demonstrated that psychological disorders such as depression create a bias in information 
processing that leads to automatic patterns of thinking that are characterized by 
pessimism, negativity and unrealistic interpretation.  This process begins when 
underlying structures that help organize the environment, called schemas, are activated 
by environmental stressors and give way to distorted patterns of thinking (Wright & 
Beck, 1983).  These thinking distortions fuel the individual’s view of his or her future as 
hopeless.        
The current high rate of suicide suggests that there is more research to be done in 
this area.  The exploration of the cognitive factors in suicidal individuals can lead to 
better identification of epidemiological markers and to improved prevention and 
treatment of those who are suicidal.      
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study was to examine cognitive distortions as a mediator 
between early maladaptive schema and hopelessness.  To date, no studies have examined 
the relationship between early maladaptive schema and distorted thinking as it relates to 
hopelessness. Because hopelessness is a risk factor and warning sign in suicidal behavior 
researchers must illuminate how hopelessness develops and is identified in clinical 
populations.  The hope is that this study would help practitioners to understand further 
the mechanisms through which distorted thinking leads to hopelessness and would 
contribute to research on suicide prevention and treatment in the field of psychology.  
Overview of Literature Review 
 Early research identified early maladaptive schemas in self-report inventories like 
the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (Weissman & Beck, 1978), while later work of 
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cognitive psychologists highlighted differences in information processing of subjects 
with depression (Derry & Kuiper, 1981; Dobson & Shaw, 1987).  Cognitive theory 
espouses that early maladaptive schema is latent until triggered by external stressors.  The 
principal product of early maladaptive schema is biased information processing, which 
distorts an individual’s perception and thoughts. 
Evidence of cognitive distortions has been found in the sexual offender 
(Blumenthal, Gudjonsson, & Burns, 1999), the child and adolescent (Leitenberg, Yost, & 
Carroll-Wilson, 1986; Weems, Berman, Silverman, & Saavedra, 2001), depression 
(DeMonbreun & Craighead, 1977), and behavioral health literature (Turk & Rudy, 1992).  
The literature strongly suggests that distorted thinking plays a role in the development 
and maintenance of a number of emotional states.   
Hopelessness is correlated with depression and even more strongly correlated 
with suicide (Minkoff, Bergman, Beck & Beck, 1973).  The predominant theories of 
hopelessness are those of Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979) and Abramson et al. 
(1989).  Currently, evidence suggests the role of early maladaptive schema and distorted 
cognitions in the development of hopelessness (Haaga, Ernst, & Dyck, 1991). 
Relevance to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy 
The current study is relevant to cognitive behavioral therapy in a number of ways.  
First, the theoretical foundation of both the cognitive theories of depression and 
hopelessness are based on information-processing theory.  Cognitive processes and faulty 
information processing are at the core of psychiatric illness and play a considerable role 
in the maintenance of psychological dysfunction.   
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Second, early maladaptive schemas, cognitive structures that organize and guide 
behavior, are theorized to act as a bias that distorts perception and thinking.  Schema 
therapy is a relatively recent treatment in cognitive behavioral therapy, which attempts to 
alter these deep maladaptive cognitive structures (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003).   
Third, the development of hopelessness is theorized to be intimately connected to 
distorted thinking.  Abramson et al.’s (1989) hopelessness theory and Beck et al.’s (1979) 
cognitive theory of depression espouse that cognitions are one of the principal 
components in the development of hopelessness.  Additionally, recognizing and disputing 
distorted thinking is widely accepted as an efficacious cognitive approach in the 
treatment of psychological disorders like depression.           
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Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
Definition of Schemas 
In its broadest sense, a schema is a configuration or structure.  Schema definition 
poses problems because schemas represent constructs in the mind that cannot be isolated 
or measured (Oei & Baranoff, 2007).  A number of authors have attempted to 
characterize and define schemas, and their definitions have more in common than not, 
with the major divergence being whether schemas represent cognitive structures or 
beliefs (Layden, Newman, Freeman, & Byers Morse, 1993).   
For example, in his earlier work, Beck (1964) defined schemas as cognitive 
structures that aid in screening, coding, and evaluating.  They “abstract and mold the raw 
data into thoughts and cognitions” (p. 562).  Therefore, Beck’s view of schemas was that 
they are cognitive structures of which the product was cognitive content.  In a later work, 
Beck and Clark (1988) described schemas as “functional structures of relatively enduring 
representations of prior knowledge and experience” (p. 24).  Clark, Beck, and Alford 
(1999) elaborated upon this idea and defined schemas as “relatively enduring internal 
cognitive structures of stored generic or prototypical features of stimuli, ideas, or 
experiences that are used to organize new information in a meaningful way thereby 
determining how phenomena are perceived and conceptualized” (p. 79).   
Alternatively, Padesky (1994) chose to refer to schemas as core beliefs, as did 
Beck, Brown, et al. (1990), who referred to them as “cognitive schemas or controlling 
beliefs” (p. 4), giving the impression that schemas and cognitive content are 
interchangeable, rather than separate constructs.  This gives the impression that in a 
clinical context, fine distinctions need not be made.  For the purpose of consistency, the 
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following definition will be used in the current research: “A broad pervasive theme or 
pattern comprised of memories, emotions, cognitions, and bodily sensations regarding 
oneself and one’s relationships with others, developed during childhood or adolescence, 
elaborated throughout one’s lifetime and dysfunctional to a significant degree” (Young et 
al., 2003, p. 7). 
Characteristics of Schemas 
As a result of the difficulty defining and measuring the schema construct, many 
authors have attempted to identify important characteristics of schema.  The following 
characteristics are outlined in the literature:   
1. Schemas summarize important information about objects and events (Cowan, 
Pines, & Meltzer, 1999). 
2. Schemas represent environmental information in a way that helps individuals 
internalize it (Cowan et al., 1999).  
3. Schemas assimilate environmental stimuli in a way that is consistent with their 
organization (i.e., they create a bias in processing; Cowan et al., 1999). 
4. Information from the environment can alter schemas (i.e., schemas can be 
changed; Cowan et al., 1999). 
5. Schemas are templates that are used to predict future states of the environment 
(Cowan et al., 1999). 
6. Schemas can contain other schemas (e.g., “I’m physically unattractive” may 
encompass schemas about the hair, body shape and weight, nose, skin, etc.; 
Cowan et al., 1999). 
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7. Schemas can be either positive and adaptive or negative and maladaptive (Alford 
& Beck, 1997; Cowan et al., 1999; Young et al., 2003). 
8. Schemas can have differing degrees of valence, meaning they may be latent (i.e., 
not biasing information processing) or hypervalent (i.e., almost continually 
activated) at different points in time (Beck, Freeman, et al., 1990). 
9. Schema rigidity exists on a continuum from flexible to rigid.  This continuum 
influences schemas’ ability to be modified or changed via psychological 
intervention (Beck, Freeman, et al., 1990).  
10. Schemas can be narrow, discrete, or broad in focus (e.g., “My nose is pointy” vs. 
“I’m physically unattractive”; Cowan et al., 1999).   
In the context of emotional disorders, it is important to recognize that once 
formed, schemas guide information processing by biasing which information from an 
individual’s environment is selected, encoded, organized, stored, and retrieved.  In this 
way, schemas act as filters that dictate how one perceives him or herself, others, and the 
environment (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg,  2005).  Schemas act upon raw sensory data, 
which allows individuals to make sense of incoming data that may not have  particular 
meanings or context of their own (Beck, Freeman, et al., 1990). 
Historical Roots of Schemas 
The notion of schemas has been cited back to the early Greek philosophers such 
as Chrysippus (ca. 297-206 B.C.) and Plato (ca. 423-338 B.C.; Young et al., 2003), both 
of whom are credited with helping define schemas’ chief property as a “reduced 
description of important aspects of an object or event” (Cowan et al., 1999, p. 265).  In 
the 18th century, Kant proposed a “product of the imagination” to explain mental 
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representation and its association with the outside world (Kant, 1855, p. 109).  Piaget is 
generally given credit for coining the term “schema” as it is used today (Young et al., 
2003).   
Piaget was the first psychologist to examine the notion of schemas.  His major 
contribution to the concept of schemas was assimilation and accommodation. 
Assimilation is the idea that schemas aid the integration of new environmental 
information (Cowan et al., 1999).  For example, an infant’s feeding schema involves the 
sequence of grasping the breast with his or her mouth and sucking.  Later, the infant is 
introduced to bottle-feeding and the mother’s nipple is replaced by a manufactured rubber 
nipple.  Through assimilation, Piaget proposed that the infant would incorporate novel 
stimuli from the environment (i.e., the rubber nipple) into his or her existing schema for 
feeding (i.e., grasping and sucking the mother’s nipple).  Thus, information from his or 
her environment is integrated into a preexisting schema for feeding.   
Piaget also noted that individuals are confronted with environmental stimuli that 
do not fit already established schemas, thereby requiring a shift in current schemas.  Here 
the individual adds new information that expands existing schemas, a process Piaget 
referred to as accommodation.  For example, when a baby begins spoon-feeding, he or 
she may first suck the spoon as was done earlier with the breast and bottle.  In time, 
through accommodation, the baby will change his or her behavior and make room for this 
new information (i.e., eating from a spoon), thus expanding the existing feeding schema.  
Piaget believed that both assimilation and accommodation allowed individuals to learn 
and adapt to novel stimuli in their environments (Cowan et al., 1999).   
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While Piaget pioneered the notion of schemas in terms of cognitive development 
and learning, Bartlett examined the role of schemas in constructive memory.  Bartlett 
used the concept of schemas to examine how individuals reconstructed stories from 
memory.  In his most famous experiments, subjects read the Native American folk tale, 
The War of the Ghosts, and were asked to recall the story over a period of hours, weeks, 
months, and years (Cowan et al., 1999).  Bartlett’s data suggested that memory “is an 
active, dynamic, inferential process that is better characterized as constructive than 
reproductive” (Johnston, 2001, p. 342) and characterized memory as predominantly 
inaccurate.  Subjects consistently made reproduction errors, such as omitting/adding 
details and rationalizing vague content, in an attempt to explain, simplify, understand, 
and accept it (Bartlett, 1932).   
Bartlett explained this phenomenon in terms of cognitive schemas.  According to 
Bartlett, environmental stimuli are encoded by relating it to similar events and already 
stored encoded information.  Bartlett made several critical contributions to the 
development of schema theory during his research on memory.  First, a person’s 
experiences and reactions play out on future experiences.  That is, perception is 
constructed based on past experiences in similar situations.  Second, because of their 
reliance on experiences, schemas allow individuals to forecast, plan, and carry out 
behavior (Bartlett, 1932).  Third, and most relevant to this research, schemas can be 
either adaptive or maladaptive (Cowan et al., 1999).  In this sense, schemas allow for 
memory and judgment errors via the distortion of incoming information.   
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Schematic Processing Theories of Emotional Dysfunction 
In the 1960s, Beck adapted existing notions of schema and information processing 
to his cognitive theory of emotional dysfunction.  He theorized that thinking emerges 
from underlying attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs formed during early life experiences 
(Yurica, 2002).  The most cited schematic processing models in the field of psychology 
are those of Beck (1997) and Young et al. (2003).  Both will be described in detail.     
According to Beck’s cognitive theory, schemas play a critical role in determining (a) 
how an individual processes and assigns meaning to environmental stimuli, (b) the 
information that the person attends to and remembers, (c) functional and dysfunctional 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral patterns that increase vulnerability to clinical 
syndromes, and (d) overall adaptation and functioning in general society.  Beck’s past 
model represented simple schematic processing.  In this theory, schemas guided 
information processing by biasing the information from an individual’s environment that 
is selected, encoded, organized, stored and retrieved.  More recently, his model of 
schematic processing was altered to account for a number of problems in his earlier 
theory (Alford & Beck, 1997; Beck, 1997; Clark et al., 1999). 
Beck’s (1997) current model of schematic processing has added the concept of 
modes to his theory.  Modes are defined as  “specific clusters of interrelated cognitive-
conceptual, affective, physiological, behavioral and motivational schemas organized to 
deal with particular demands placed on the organism” (Clark et al., 1999, p. 88).  Modes, 
or broad schema subsets, are offered rather than a simple cognitive schema to explain the 
complexity seen in emotional and psychological dysfunction.  Modes are viewed as either 
primal (i.e., fundamental to survival) or minor (i.e., activities of everyday life that are 
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learned and normally under conscious control) and make up the basic systems of 
personality.   
Beck’s concept of modes addresses five interrelated systems: (a) cognitive, (b) 
affective, (c) motivational and behavioral, (d) physiological, and (e) conscious control 
systems.  The cognitive system is related to information processing, including data 
selection, attention, assignment of meaning, memory, and recall.  Beck (1997) described 
memory as particularly significant in the cognitive system because memories of earlier 
experiences can trigger reactions to current events.  The affective system is related to 
emotion and affect.  These schemas influence how an individual feels.  Beck espoused 
that both positive and negative emotions exist to facilitate adaptation.  Negative emotions 
cue individuals to pay attention to situations that weaken or threaten well-being, whereas 
positive emotions reinforce goal-directed behavior.  The motivational and behavioral 
system drives an individual’s behavior or lack thereof.  Beck (1997) distinguished these 
systems as automatic and outside of awareness and voluntary control.  The motivational 
and behavioral system encompasses emergency systems, such as fight, flight, or freeze, 
and is automatic and tied to primal modes.  Once triggered, these automatic impulses can 
often be brought under conscious control.  The physiological system is comprised of 
schemas related to central nervous system activation or inhibition and directs the way 
individuals assign meaning to physiological cues.  For instance, the physiological 
symptoms of muscle tension and increased adrenaline in anxiety enhance the flight 
impulse (i.e., motivational and behavioral system), which is further reinforced by the 
assignment of meaning to the symptoms that one is in danger (i.e., cognitive system).  
The conscious control system differs from the aforementioned systems in that it is less 
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automatic and is under conscious control.  It allows individuals to apply logic actively, 
shift attention, activate behavior, and ignore unpleasant emotions.   
The reaction to a given situation is believed to initiate activation of a primal mode 
(e.g., danger, aggression, or defense), which activates the modal subsystem structure 
(e.g., behavioral/motivational, affective, and physiological schemas) to produce a 
multidimensional psychological dysfunction.  In the case of a bridge phobia, for example, 
the activating event of having to cross a bridge is processed through the person’s primal 
mode for danger, which alerts the person to impending danger.  This signal, in turn, 
activates the related modal systems, including affective (e.g., increased anxiety), 
physiological (e.g., increased heart rate), and motivational (e.g., impulse to escape).  If 
the person were to continue and cross the bridge in this state, he or she would utilize the 
conscious control system to override the primal impulse to escape danger (Beck et al., 
2005).   
The other most cited schematic processing theory is that of Young et al. (2003). 
Young et al. (2003) conceptualized that schemas emerge primarily from unmet core 
emotional needs.  They identified the basic needs as (a) secure attachments to others; (b) 
autonomy, competence, and a sense of identity; (c) freedom to express valid needs and 
emotions, (d) spontaneity and play; and (e) realistic limits and self-control (p. 10).  They 
outlined 18 early maladaptive schemas under five domains.   
Schemas under the Disconnection and Rejection domain are characterized by the 
inability to form secure, satisfying attachments to others.  Their families of origin are 
typified by instability, abusiveness, rejection, and isolation.   
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS, SCHEMA AND HOPELESSNESS 
 
13 
1. Abandonment/ Instability—Individuals with this schema believe significant 
others to be emotionally inconsistent and unavailable (p. 13). 
2. Mistrust/Abuse—Individuals with this schema have a general distrust of others 
because they believe that they will be abused or exploited by others (p. 13). 
3. Emotional Deprivation—Individuals with this schema hold the expectation that 
adequate emotional support will not be provided by others (p. 13).   
4. Defectiveness/Shame—Individuals with this schema believe they are inherently 
flawed or bad and that others would not love them if these flaws were exposed (p. 
13). 
5. Social Isolation/Alienation—Individuals with this schema have a pervasive sense 
of feeling different and not belonging to social groups or the larger society (p. 13). 
The Impaired Autonomy and Performance domain includes schemas 
characterized by an inability to separate from one’s family and to function independently 
compared with one’s peers.  Families of origin are often overprotective and neglectful in 
a manner that impairs the individual’s development of self-confidence and self-
sufficiency. 
6. Dependence/Incompetence—Individuals with this schema feel unable to function 
independently without help from others.  Everyday responsibilities pose serious 
obstacles to these individuals, who often lack self-efficacy and problem-solving 
skills necessary to function independently in daily life (p. 18).  
7. Vulnerability to Harm or Illness—These individuals can be characterized by 
catastrophic thoughts about impending medical, emotional, and external disasters 
and the belief that they cannot cope with these situations (p. 18). 
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8. Enmeshment/Undeveloped Self—Individuals with this schema tend to be overly 
involved with one or more significant others to the degree the relationship inhibits 
individual and social development (p. 18). 
9. Failure—Individuals with this schema believe failure is inevitable in areas of 
performance.  Beliefs about themselves include being unintelligent, untalented, or 
unsuccessful (p. 18). 
The Impaired Limits domain includes those individuals who have nonexistent or 
underdeveloped internal limits and/or self-discipline.  These individuals often have 
difficulty respecting the rights of others and cooperating.  Families of origin often include 
overindulgent or permissive caregivers, and these individuals frequently present as 
selfish, spoiled, irresponsible or narcissistic (p. 18).    
10. Entitlement/Grandiosity—Individuals with this schema carry the belief they are 
entitled to special rights and privileges because of their inherent superiority to 
others.  These beliefs often interfere with their ability to develop appropriate 
empathy and adhere to the rules of healthy social relationships (p. 19). 
11. Insufficient Self-Control/Self-Discipline—Individuals lack the ability or desire to 
implement self-control or frustration tolerance necessary to achieve their goals.  
They have difficulty regulating their emotions and often act impulsively (p. 19). 
The Other-Directedness schema is characterized by meeting the needs of others to 
the detriment of one’s own needs.  Families of origin are often marked by conditional 
acceptance and value of parental feelings above children’s. 
12. Subjugation—Individuals with this schema give up control to others, which 
functions to avoid negative feelings and abandonment.  Their belief that their own 
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needs are less important than those of others often leads to anger and resentment 
(p. 19). 
13. Self-Sacrifice—Similar to the subjugation schema, these individuals often put 
their own needs second to those of others in an attempt to spare others pain, avoid 
guilt, and increase self-esteem (p. 20). 
14. Approval-Seeking/Recognition-Seeking—This schema is most closely related to 
having an external locus of control.  That is, rather than developing a secure sense 
of self from within, it is entirely contingent on the approval and recognition of 
others (p. 20).   
The Overvigilance and Inhibition domain is characterized by suppression of 
emotions and impulses.  Individuals’ rules about performance are often directly 
connected to their happiness in life.  Families of origin often are exemplified by 
hypervigilance about negative life events that lead to a negative life view.  Individuals 
often present as pessimistic and worrisome.         
15. Negativity/Pessimism—Individuals with this schema focus on the negative 
aspects of life.  Their thinking is marked by the expectation that things will go 
wrong, and they often focus on the negative stimuli while ignoring the positive (p. 
20).   
16. Emotional Inhibition—Individuals with this schema exhibit severe inhibition of 
emotional expression, communication, or behavior in an attempt to avoid 
disapproval of others, shame, or impulsivity (p. 20). 
17. Unrelenting Standards/Hypercriticalness—Individuals with this schema strive to 
meet very high, often unattainable standards to avoid criticism.  This schema may 
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present as perfectionism, excessive rules about life, and preoccupation with time 
and efficiency (p. 21).     
18. Punitiveness—Individuals with this schema maintain the conviction that they and 
others should be punished for mistakes or imperfection.      
Young et al. (2003) identified four themes of early life experiences that contribute 
to the development of maladaptive schema in the aforementioned domains.  The first is 
when a child experiences too little love, stability, or understanding.  The second is the 
experience of traumatization or victimization.  The third is when the child overidentifies 
with and internalizes a parent’s thoughts, feelings, needs, or behaviors.  The fourth is 
when individuals are denied the opportunity to become self-sufficient (e.g., via 
overprotectiveness) or not taught appropriate limits (e.g., via overindulgence).   Other 
research has shown correlations between early interactions with caregivers and later 
personal and interpersonal maladjustment (Oei & Baranoff, 2007).  These early 
maladaptive experiences with caregivers are theorized to interact with a person’s 
temperament (i.e., stable personality traits from birth) in the formation of maladaptive 
schemas, which, in turn, lead to and maintain clinical psychopathology.   
Maladaptive schemas comprise myriad emotions, cognitions, memories, and 
physiological sensations related to early maladaptive experiences.  In the child’s family 
of origin, early maladaptive schemas were adaptive, but they become maladaptive outside 
of the original familial context (Oei & Baranoff, 2007).  Therefore, the early developed 
schemas help children to understand and react to dysfunctional environments.  Outside of 
those dysfunctional environments (e.g., in adult relationships), the early formed schemas 
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continue to play out, even in the absence of dysfunction.  Young et al. (2003) suggested 
that this characteristic of early maladaptive schemas helps ensure their maintenance.   
Because of their early acquisition, schemas are familiar and trigger human beings’ 
need for consistency.  That is, an individual will be drawn to experiences that trigger their 
schemas.  Their rigidity is, in part, caused by reinforcement of the comfort of familiarity.  
Authors also identified “schema perpetuation” (Young et al., 2003, p. 30) in the 
maintenance of early maladaptive schema.  This perpetuation occurs primarily through 
reinforcement by cognitions, behavior, and feelings.   
Cognitive reinforcement occurs via cognitive distortions, which are errors in logic 
that contribute to inaccurate perceptions of situations and interactions (Freeman, Pretzer, 
Fleming, & Simon, 2004).  Individuals look for information in situations and interactions 
that confirm their schemas and ignore evidence that rejects them.  Emotionally, they 
avoid or inhibit feelings associated with schemas, thus preventing awareness of schemas 
and any chance of correcting them.  Behaviorally, individuals unconsciously choose 
situations that trigger their schemas and elicit responses from others that provide 
reinforcement of their schemas.   
The perpetuation of schemas often elicits coping behaviors to reduce 
psychological pain.  Young et al. (2003) identified (a) overcompensation, (b) avoidance, 
and (c) surrender as the three predominant behavioral coping styles of individuals with 
early maladaptive schemas.  Individuals also exhibit countless coping responses that 
correlate with each of the styles.  They often have a combination of coping styles and 
responses depending on the situation.  Overcompensation involves acting as though the 
schema were not true.  The reactions of individuals who utilize this style are often 
 18 
disproportionate to the circumstances of the situation.  The avoidance style is 
characterized by averting thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that may activate their 
maladaptive schemas.  These individuals may use distractions, ranging from thought 
stopping to substance abuse, to avoid experiencing their schema.  Schema surrender is a 
coping style characterized by accepting the schema as true and giving into it.  As adults, 
these individuals tend to think and act in ways that perpetuate their childhood schemas.   
As mentioned earlier, problems defining, assessing, and measuring schemas have 
created obstacles to their empirical examination.  The result is little empirical support for 
their existence.  However, schematic processing theories have gained support in the field.  
For example, Oei and Baranoff (2007) acknowledged the clinical importance of easily 
and reliably identifying schemas for which clinical interventions could be appropriately 
implemented to decrease psychopathology.  Unless addressed, schemas can confound 
traditional cognitive therapy in a number of ways.  First, because of their pervasiveness 
and rigidity, schemas can inhibit the development of a sound therapeutic alliance.  
Second, schemas can negatively affect goal setting in treatment.  Third, schemas may 
interfere with motivation and discipline (Young et al., 2003).  Padesky (1994) also 
discussed the effect of untreated schemas on the treatment process, including interference 
with the therapeutic relationship.  She believes schemas to be the driving force behind 
cognitions and behaviors that characterize dysfunction. 
Evidence of Schemas 
Anderson, Reynolds, Schallert, and Goetz (1977) examined schematic 
frameworks that individuals use to understand verbal communication.  Researchers 
hypothesized that a person’s past experiences and worldview would influence his or her 
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comprehension.  Subjects were 30 college-aged women from an educational psychology 
course for students planning a career in music education and 30 college-aged men from 
two weight-lifting physical-education courses.  Subjects were asked to read two passages 
that could be interpreted differently.  The first was about a prison escape that could have 
also been interpreted as escaping a wrestling hold.  The second, about a group coming 
together to play cards, could have been interpreted also as an orchestra woodwind section 
meeting for practice.  All subjects were asked to read, engage in a delay activit,y and then 
recall the passage.  Afterward, subjects answered multiple-choice items that corresponded 
with interpretations of the passage content.   
Data suggested that subject background significantly influenced the way in which 
subjects perceived the passage content.  Those with aspirations to teach music were 
significantly more likely to interpret the card-playing passage in a music context and 
physical education majors to interpret the prison escape in a wrestling context.  
Furthermore, more than 80% of subjects reported not recognizing possible alternative 
interpretations in the passages.  Researchers suggested that cognitive schemas, as 
described by Bartlett (1932), influenced subject perception of passage content.  Subject 
responses showed they filled information gaps and distorted ambiguous passage content 
in an attempt to assimilate the passage content with personal experience and knowledge 
(Anderson et al., 1977).  These results were especially promising because they utilized 
research methodology that was stronger than Bartlett’s earlier, more primitive methods.   
Sjogren and Timpson (1979) replicated the aforementioned study primarily 
because of confounds related to participant sex.  All of the music majors were women 
while the physical education majors were men.  This confound was addressed by using 
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109 coed college-aged students majoring in either art or physical education.  The second 
modification to the study was to add titles, which were consistent with one of the two 
possible interpretations, to some of the passages.  Materials and procedure were nearly 
identical to those of Anderson et al. (1977) and results were consistent with the earlier 
study.   
Data suggested there was a title effect that made interpretation of the passages 
less ambiguous.  This stated, not all subjects gave interpretations consistent with the 
passage title.  Authors found the effect of subject sex to be partly responsible for the 
results of the original Anderson et al. (1977) study.  However, the data supported 
differences in passage interpretation resulting from subject background (Sjogren & 
Timpson, 1979).  Overall, Anderson et al.’s (1977) original findings were supported.   
Another study examined the relationship between cultural schemas and reading 
comprehension in a sample of 105 African American and Caucasian eighth graders 
(Reynolds, Taylor, Steffenson, Shirey, & Anderson, 1982).  Researchers asked subjects 
to read about “playing the dozens,” an oral tradition in African American culture in 
which insults are traded between two male participants until one fails to come up with an 
insulting response.  The competition is frequently harmless and good natured.  Subjects 
were introduced to the concept in the form of a letter from one student to another.  
Authors hypothesized that African American subjects would interpret “playing the 
dozens” for a harmless competition in which the winner gained peer respect, while the 
Caucasian subjects would interpret the interaction as a fight.   
Data supported the hypothesis, and African American subjects, significantly more 
than Caucasian subjects, regarded the interaction as playful insulting, whereas Caucasian 
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students interpreted the interaction as a fight.  African American subjects were more 
likely than Caucasian subjects to perceive students involved in the interaction as friends. 
Authors suggested that cultural schemas influenced subjects’ reading comprehension.  
Specifically, the information in the letter was biased in favor of the African American 
students because their experiences and reactions drove their perceptions of the letter’s 
content (Reynolds et al., 1982). 
 More recently, Calvete (2008) examined the role of cognitive variables in 
adolescent antisocial behavior.  The author hypothesized that cognitive schemas of 
justification of the use of violence and grandiosity combined with an impulsive cognitive 
style would predict antisocial behavior in adolescent subjects.  In addition, the 
relationship between gender and antisocial behavior was examined.  The author 
hypothesized that girls and boys would show an equal association between schemas and 
antisocial behavior, but that boys would score higher than girls and thus exhibit higher 
rates of related behavior.  Subjects were 974 (457 girls and 517 boys) Spanish adolescent 
students who completed measures of justification of violence, early maladaptive schema, 
impulsive style, and aggressive and rule-breaking behaviors.  Subjects were measured on 
two occasions over a 6 month period.  On the second occasion, only the measure of 
delinquent behavior was administered.   
Results suggested that schema regarding the justification of violence and 
grandiosity predicted antisocial behavior in Spanish adolescents.  Boys were shown to 
have higher rates of the aforementioned schemas, which may explain higher rates of 
delinquent behavior in boys.   However, there was no significant difference between rates 
of schema endorsement as related to aggressive behavior, which is inconsistent with the 
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author’s gender hypothesis.  Finally, impulsive style was not significantly correlated with 
antisocial behavior, but was associated with justification of violence and grandiosity 
schemas (Calvete, 2008).             
 Seager (2005) examined the presence of self-schemas related to violence in 50 
male inmates from a minimum-security Canadian prison.  Subjects’ histories of charges 
and/or convictions related to assault, robbery, and fights were collected from their prison 
files.  They were measured via questionnaire for the presence of psychopathy and 
impulsivity, and completed questions related to four vignettes to identify schemas for a 
hostile world.  Schemas for a hostile world were also assessed through a binocular rivalry 
task in which subjects viewed two opposing images, one violent and one nonviolent, 
through a stereoscope.   
Results from the study showed a significant correlation between schemas for a 
violent world and subject violence ratings on both verbal (vignettes) and visual (binocular 
rivalry) measures.  In addition, schemas for a hostile world were significantly correlated 
with impulsivity.  The author suggested that schemas for a violent world, past violence, 
assaults, and fights were consistent predictors of violent behavior in subjects.  Further 
analysis revealed that impulsivity and schemas for a violent world accounted for most of 
the variance in violence rating and psychopathy (Seager, 2005). 
 In a different study, Varela et al. (2004) sought to reveal cultural differences 
among Mexican, Mexican-American, and European-American children in the reporting 
of anxiety symptoms.  Authors hypothesized that cultural conceptions of mental illness 
would influence how children from different cultures reported anxiety symptoms.  
Differences in reporting were attributed to early developed schemas learned in families of 
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origin.  Cultural schemas were identified as collectivism and simpatia, which are the 
beliefs that (a) an individual’s self-worth is determined by people in their valued group 
and (b) one should not disrupt the homeostasis of the group, even if it means making 
personal sacrifices, respectively.   
Authors hypothesized that Mexican and Mexican-American children would report 
more anxiety symptoms than their European-American counterparts would.  However, 
parents of Mexican descent children would provide fewer anxiety-based interpretations 
and more somatic interpretations.  This discrepancy may be because somatic 
interpretations are more culturally acceptable in Mexican-based cultures.  The scores of 
children of Mexican descent were expected to be higher on measures of simpatia and 
collectivism than were the scores of European-American subjects (Varela et al., 2004).  
Mexican and Mexican-American subjects identified more physiological 
symptoms of anxiety than European-American subjects did.  Authors suggested that this 
might be the result of the influence of cultural schema on subject symptom reporting.  
Mexican and Mexican-American subjects also identified more strongly with the cultural 
schema of collectivism and simpatia than did European-American subjects.  This stronger 
identification was attributed to experiences within one’s culture and family of origin.  As 
hypothesized, parents of Mexican and Mexican-American children generated more 
somatic and non-anxious interpretations of their children’s symptoms than European-
American parents did.  This was attributed to family interaction patterns that shaped and 
reinforced cultural schema in subjects of Mexican descent (Varela et al., 2004). 
Much of the empirical evidence conducted on maladaptive schemas in the literature 
utilizes the Young Schema Questionnaire (Young & Brown, 2001), which is described 
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later in detail.  Owing to the sound psychometric properties of Young and Brown’s 
schema questionnaire, the current investigation will utilize Young’s model of schematic 
processing and his questionnaire to measure early maladaptive schemas.  A review of 
tools used to measure cognitive schemas follows.    
Measures of Schemas 
Most of the literature on identification of early maladaptive schemas has examined 
the factor structures of the Young Schema Questionnaire—Long and Short Forms 
(Young & Brown, 2001; Young & Brown, 2005), 205- and 75-question self-report 
inventories, respectively, used to identify early maladaptive schemas in clinical settings.  
Exploratory factor analyses in a sample of 575 students supported 15 of the original 16 
factors on the Young Schema Questionnaire—Long Form (Schmidt, et al., 1995).  As 
part of the same investigation, Schmidt et al. (1995) conducted a factor analysis on 187 
clinical outpatients, 61% of whom were diagnosed with an Axis I disorder and 55% of 
whom were diagnosed with an Axis II disorder.  Results supported 15 of the original 16 
early maladaptive schemas originally proposed by Young.  This small sample is 
noteworthy given the number of items on the Young Schema Questionnaire—Long Form 
(Oei & Baranoff, 2007).  Lee, Taylor, and Dunn (1999) resolved this discrepancy by 
factor analyzing data from 433 patients working with psychologists in the Australian 
health-care system.  Results supported 14 of the original 16 factors proposed by Young 
and established that the measure had good internal consistency and predictive validity.   
The Young Schema Questionnaire—Long Form (2001) has been shown to predict 
depression in undergraduates (Harris & Curtin, 2002; Schmidt et al., 1995).  Similar 
analyses of the Young Schema Questionnaire—Short Form (2005) have been conducted 
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as well.  Overall, findings indicate that the instrument is sound for use in clinical 
populations (Welburn, Coristine, Dagg, Pontefract & Jordan, 2002), has good internal 
consistency, and is predictive of eating disorders (Waller, Meyer & Vartouhi, 2001) and 
depression (Glaser, Campbell, Calhoun, Bates, & Petrocelli, 2002; Welburn et al., 2002) 
in clinical samples.   
In addition to Young’s measures of early maladaptive schema, Beck, Freeman, et 
al. (1990) developed a schema content checklist to assist in the diagnosis of Axis II 
disorders.  Their checklist identifies core beliefs consistent with Avoidant, Dependent, 
Passive-Aggressive, Obsessive-Compulsive, Antisocial, Narcissistic, Histrionic, 
Schizoid, Schizotypal, and Paranoid personality disorders.  An example of beliefs 
consistent with Dependent personality disorder would be, “I am needy and weak” (p. 
360) and “I can’t make decisions on my own” (p. 360).  These beliefs are consistent with 
schemas of incompetence and helplessness that frequently characterize the thoughts of 
individuals with the disorder.  There are no identified psychometric data on this checklist 
to date.   
Measures that assess schemas can play an important role in the diagnosis and 
treatment of psychological disorders with cognitive behavioral therapy.  However, the 
use of objective measures in clinical settings often can be costly and impractical. 
Fortunately, Beck (1964) and Beck, Freeman, et al. (1990) suggested that schemas can be 
identified via their cognitive content.  Authors have encouraged the identification of 
cognitive distortions to root out underlying core beliefs related to patient cognitive 
schemas (Padesky, 1994).  
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Cognitive Distortions 
According to Alford and Beck (1997), cognitive schemas act to bias information 
processing in a way that produces cognitive distortions.  Individuals become susceptible 
to specific types of cognitive distortions, which, in turn, predispose them to specific 
emotional disorders.  However, schemas reside at an unconscious level, which makes 
defining, assessing, and measuring them difficult (Oei & Baranoff, 2007).   
Beck (1995) noted that schemas are so core to one’s perception that they often 
cannot be verbally articulated.  The unconscious nature of schemas is a treatment 
limitation in that they are not easily accessible by patients.  In addition, a clinician may 
need time to identify, present, and treat them, depending on the nature of the schema 
itself. 
Schemas can be thought to exist on a continuum from flexible to rigid.  This 
continuum means that some schemas may be more amenable to change than others.  For 
instance, continually active schemas in patients with personality disorders may be easier 
than others to identify, but much harder to treat because of persistent reinforcement by 
cognitions, behavior and feelings.  It may take years to alter patients’ deeply imbedded 
beliefs about themselves, others, and the world.  Alternatively, less active schemas that 
have not been as persistently reinforced may be more difficult to identify but more 
amenable to change in treatment.   
Schemas often can be identified and modified through patients’ more accessible 
conscious cognitions (Beck, 1995).  The more accessible distorted cognitions that derive 
from maladaptive schemas are more amenable to treatment through cognitive behavioral 
therapy.  Patients can be taught to identify distorted thoughts, subject them to logic 
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through testing, and correct these thoughts.  New more adaptive thoughts can be 
generated to replace distorted ones.  This change can occur with schemas; however, as 
mentioned before, this process often takes more time because of the level of 
reinforcement over time that has helped imbed the schemas.  Thus, both core beliefs and 
cognitive distortions are treated similarly, though cognitive distortions respond better in 
the short-term as a result of greater accessibility and less persistent reinforcement over 
time, while schemas typically persist more strongly and take longer to alter.  The more 
accessible distorted thinking that drives emotional disorders is an obvious starting point 
for clinicians and their patients in working from a cognitive behavioral therapy modality.  
Because they are partly perpetuated by cognitions that are accessible, schemas can 
often be reliably identified and modified through cognitive content (Young et al., 2003).    
Through his observations of depressed patients, Beck (1964) reported that the content of 
schemas could be identified through “chronic misconceptions, distorted attitudes, invalid 
premises, and unrealistic goals and expectations” (p. 563).  Over the past 5 decades, Beck 
and colleagues have studied and developed the theory, assessment, and treatment of the 
cognitive distortions.  One of cognitive theory’s major contributions to the field of 
psychology has been its emphasis on the mediating effect of this “idiosyncratic thought 
content indicative of distorted or unrealistic conceptualizations” in psychological 
dysfunction (Beck, 1963, p. 36).   
Definitions of Cognitive Distortions 
Beck (1967) viewed cognitive distortions as the result of faulty information 
processing that produced predictable, identifiable errors in thinking.  Haaga, Ernst, and 
Dyck et al. (1991) defined a cognitive distortion as “a judgment or conclusion that 
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disagrees or is inconsistent with some commonly accepted measure of objective reality 
(p. 178).”  Similarly, other authors defined cognitive distortions as “inaccurate ways of 
attending to or conferring meaning on experience” (Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & 
Gibbs, 2000).  Freeman, et al. (2004) identified cognitive distortions as errors in logic 
that lead individuals to erroneous conclusions.  Beck (1995) defined cognitive distortions 
as consistent errors in thinking that stem from a systematic bias in information 
processing.  Since Beck’s original work in the role of thinking in depression, a number of 
cognitive distortions have been identified.      
Types of Cognitive Distortions 
 Beck (1967) originally identified the following six distortions: 
1. Jumping to Conclusions (also referred to as Arbitrary Inference)—interpreting 
situations, events, or experiences without supporting evidence or in the face of 
disconfirming evidence (Beck, 1963, p. 40). 
2. Selective Abstraction (also referred to as Mental Filter)—attentional resources are 
focused on one detail of a situation while other possibly more plausible 
explanations and details are ignored (Burns, 1999, p. 8; Freeman et al., 2004, p. 
5). 
3. Overgeneralization—negative events are viewed as blanket generalizations, rather 
than as isolated or infrequently occurring (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5). 
4. Magnification (also referred to as Catastrophizing) and Minimization—gross 
errors in evaluation in which negative events are seen as catastrophic and 
unbearable or positive events are treated as real, but insignificant, respectively 
(Beck, 1963, p. 41; Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).    
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5. Personalization—assuming one is the cause of a particular external event when 
other factors are responsible (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5).  
6. Absolutistic, Dichotomous Thinking (also referred to as All-or-Nothing 
Thinking)—thoughts are seen in terms of mutually exclusive categories with no 
“shades of gray” in between (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5). 
Since Beck’s identification of the aforementioned distortions, authors have identified 
others.  The following is a list of other notable cognitive distortions: 
7. “Should” Statements—the use of “should” and “have to” statements to provide 
motivation to control behavior (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5). 
8. Labeling—globally labeling oneself, rather than specific situations or behaviors 
(Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5). 
9. Emotional Reasoning—decision-making based on emotional reactions, rather than 
logic.  If one feels a certain way, then the feeling must reflect the true nature of 
the situation (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5). 
10. Fortune-Telling—negative expectations about future events that have not 
occurred are considered to be fact (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5). 
11. Mind Reading—the assumption that others think or act negatively without having 
supporting evidence to verify it (Freeman et al., 2004, p. 5). 
12.  Externalization of Self-Worth—self-worth is based on external, rather than 
internal, factors (e.g., what others think of me; Freeman & Oster, 1999; Freeman 
& DeWolf, 1992).    
13. Comparison—comparing oneself negatively to others in a way that concludes one 
is inferior to others (Freeman & DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1999).  
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14. Perfectionism—believing one must attain unattainable standards of perfection 
without reviewing evidence for reasonableness of these standards (Freeman & 
DeWolf, 1992; Freeman & Oster, 1999).  
15. Change Fallacy—the belief that one can change what others think or how they 
behave.  Often one’s happiness is contingent on others changing (Gilson & 
Freeman, 1999). 
16. Fairness Fallacy—the belief that the world should be a fair place (Gilson & 
Freeman, 1999). 
17. Ignoring Fallacy—the belief that ignoring or avoiding problems will make them 
disappear (Gilson & Freeman, 1999). 
18. “Being Right” Fallacy—the belief that being wrong is catastrophic and that one 
must constantly prove one’s thoughts and actions are correct (Gilson & Freeman, 
1999). 
19. Attachment Fallacy—the belief that being in an intimate relationship will solve 
other, unrelated problems (Gilson & Freeman, 1999). 
20. Control Fallacy—the belief that one is controlled by either external or internal 
factors.  External control results in the belief that one is powerless to control 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, while internal control creates beliefs of 
unrealistic responsibility for external events (Gilson & Freeman, 1999). 
21. Heaven’s Reward Fallacy—the belief that if one does everything perfectly, they 
will be rewarded.  Anger and disappointment result when the reward does not 
come (Gilson & Freeman, 1999). 
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22. Worrying Fallacy—the belief that worrying has a magical quality that can prevent 
negative circumstances (Gilson & Freeman, 1999). 
23. Blame—belief that others are responsible for one’s problems.  This distortion 
prevents individuals from recognizing their own role in their problems (Burns, 
1999, p. 11). 
24. Probability Thought-Action-Fusion—an intrusive thought increases the 
probability that a negative event will occur (Rachman & Shafran, 1999). 
25. Morality Thought-Action-Fusion—experiencing an intrusive thought is 
considered the equivalent to executing the prohibited act (Rachman & Shafran, 
1999). 
This list of cognitive distortions, though not exhaustive, outlines many common 
errors in thinking.  Note that some degree of cognitive distortion is normal in human 
beings, but individuals with emotional disorders show a greater degree of distorted 
thinking that is more pervasive (Beck, 1964; Rosenfield, 2004).   
Theories of Cognitive Distortions 
 There are a number of theories outlining how cognitive distortions develop. In 
line with cognitive theories of emotional disorders (see Alford & Beck, 1997 and 
Bandura, 1989), Kendall (1992) attempted to outline cognitive processing as it occurs in 
human beings.  He proposed that human cognitive processing involves four distinct 
features, which are (a) cognitive content, (b) cognitive process, (c) cognitive structures, 
and (d) cognitive products.   
 Kendall (1992) defined cognitive content as an individual’s internal self-talk that 
is stored and organized in memory.  Cognitive process refers to the functional system that 
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allows cognitive processing to occur.  For instance, processing of cognitive material 
involves memory, attentional, encoding, and retrieval functions.  Kendall referred to 
cognitive structures as schemas, or the templates through which information is organized 
and stored in long-term memory.  Finally, cognitive products are referred to as the result 
of the reciprocal action of content, process, and structure.  The way in which information 
is filtered and organized in these structures drives other aspects of cognition, such as 
distorted thinking, which resides more inside of awareness.  These distorted thoughts are 
implicated in triggering a variety of emotions and behavior.  Often, identifying and 
challenging the cognitions inside a person’s awareness is the goal of cognitive therapy 
(Beck, 1995). 
Gilbert (1998) suggested an evolutionary explanation for cognitive distortions.  
Rather than defects in information processing, he argued that distorted thinking is an 
adaptive process, the result of millions of years of quick decision-making in threatening 
situations.  Distorted thinking occurs naturally when one makes decisions with heuristics 
and is part of the natural make-up of the human brain.  For instance, he suggested that 
Absolutistic, Dichotomous Thinking (also see All-or-Nothing Thinking; i.e., experiences 
are seen in terms of mutually exclusive categories with no “shades of gray” in between) 
served the purpose of reducing reaction time, which in turn reduced the amount of time 
one stayed in a threatening situation.  Emotional Reasoning and Jumping to Conclusions 
serve similar functions of protecting individuals from exposure to threat by expediting 
decision-making. 
In their development of the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD), Yurica and 
DiTomasso (2002) considered a number of developmental theories of distorted thinking.  
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Developmental theories of cognitive distortions utilize long-standing theories of 
development (i.e., see Freud’s Psychosexual, Erikson’s Psychosocial, Piaget’s Cognitive 
Development, or Super’s Career Self-Concept).  Healthy development is viewed as the 
successful achievement of specific physical, emotional and psychological milestones 
from birth to death.   
Layden et al. (1993) utilized Erikson’s Psychosocial stages as a way to explain 
how cognitive schemas and thus, cognitive distortions develop in Borderline Personality 
Disorder.  They suggested that Erikson’s Psychosocial stages (i.e., Trust vs. Mistrust, 
Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt, Initiative vs. Guilt and Industry vs. Inferiority) serve as 
developmental markers for cognitive schemas.  Individuals with healthy personalities are 
theorized to develop schemas consistent with the positive development of trust in others 
(i.e., Trust), confident mastery of one’s environment (i.e., Autonomy), one’s own identity 
(i.e., Initiative), and a sense of self-worth through one’s skills (i.e., Industry).  
Alternatively, individuals who suffer mistreatment, trauma, and uncertainty develop 
maladaptive schemas.  Cognitive distortions develop as the child moves through Piaget’s 
cognitive stages of development (i.e., sensory-motor, preoperational, concrete 
operational, and formal operational).  Early maladaptive schemas prime the child to 
develop different distortions at different stages as they interact with the environment.   
The synthesis of developmental and cognitive theories results in an explanation 
by which early experiences with caregivers shape children’s core beliefs about 
themselves, others, and the world, which, in turn, interacts with developing cognitive 
processes, resulting in distorted thinking.  For instance, in Borderline Personality 
Disorder, early maltreatment, inconsistency, and exposure to trauma may result in a 
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schema consistent with a lack of trust in others.  During this time, childrens’ cognitive 
development reflects using the senses to learn about themselves and the environment.  
Maladaptive schema set the stage for the child to develop a host of negative 
psychological characteristics, including a lack of object permanence.  Layden et al. 
(1993) hypothesized that the cognitive distortion, Mind Reading, or the assumption that 
others think or act negatively without having supporting evidence to verify it, develops 
during this period.  This distortion may explain the proclivity of a patient with Borderline 
Personality Disorder to misperceive the actions of others as negative. 
Empirical Support for Cognitive Distortions 
Cognitive distortions have been studied in a number of populations, including 
adult sexual offenders, children and adolescents, medical patients, and those with 
addictions.  In addition, cognitive distortions have been identified in both internalizing 
disorders (e.g., depression, anxiety) and externalizing disorders (e.g., Conduct Disorder).  
Research has continually suggested the important role that cognitions play in emotional 
disorders, and a number of studies will be examined below to support this point.   
In his influential work, Beck (1963) identified thematic content in patient 
cognitions that was congruent with specific emotional dysfunction.  In particular, 
cognitive themes of personal deficiency (e.g., low self-esteem and self-blame) 
characterized individuals with depression.  Depressed individuals tended to react to 
external situations in an “irrelevant and inappropriate” (p. 38) manner and exhibited 
frequent negative self-evaluations even when presented with evidence to the contrary.  
Similarly, anxious patients could be distinguished from depressed patients by identifying 
cognitions with themes of personal danger or threat.  
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More recently, Rosenfield (2004) demonstrated that individuals who scored 
clinically significant for an Axis I or II disorder on the Millon Clinical Multiaxial 
Inventory-III (MCMI-III) reported higher frequencies of cognitive distortions than did 
those free of clinically significant emotional disorders.  Therefore, the greater the number 
of diagnosable conditions, the greater the degree of distorted thinking an individual 
exhibited.  In addition, the presence of cognitive distortions successfully predicted the 
severity of Axis I and II disorders.  That is, the more cognitive distortions identified, the 
more severe an individual’s level of pathology.   
Abel et al. (1989) examined sexual offenders and used the Cognition Scale, a 29- 
item scale that measures distorted beliefs common among child molesters, to successfully 
differentiate child molesters from the general population based on distorted thinking.  
Furthermore, there was a positive relationship between the number of distortions 
endorsed and the amount of time engaged in deviant behavior.  This relationship 
suggested that child molesters appear to maintain a number of distorted beliefs that serve 
to justify, rationalize, and maintain deviant sexual behavior.  Authors suggested that 
successful treatment of sexual molesters include cognitive restructuring.   
Other authors have found similar results.  Bumby (1996) examined cognitive 
distortions in 89 incarcerated men who were placed into one of three treatment groups, 
which were (a) child sexual molester, (b) rapist (i.e., of women) and (c) nonsexual 
offending inmate control. Results showed that subjects in the child molester group held 
significantly more distorted beliefs about sexual behavior.  Again, authors identified 
treatment of cognitive distortions a “vital prerequisite” (p. 480) in the programming and 
treatment of sexual offenders. 
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A similar study conducted by Blumenthal et al. (1999) examined blame 
attribution in sex offenders against adults and children.  Subjects were 66 inmates who 
had committed sexual offenses against children (SOC) or adults (SOA). Researchers 
sought to examine whether the type of distortion was related to the nature of the offense, 
whether blame attribution would differ between the treatment groups and whether a 
relationship existed between specific distortions and blame attribution.  Results indicated 
that subject responses were valid; however, subjects in the SOC group showed higher 
positive impression management than did the SOA group.  SOA subjects endorsed more 
external blame (e.g., society, victim) than did SOC subjects.  This type of blame is in 
contrast to Stermac and Segal’s (1989) finding that child molesters viewed their victim as 
more responsible than did rapists and controls.   Again, authors highlighted the clear role 
that distorted cognitions, as well as blame attribution, play in sexually deviant behavior 
(Blumenthal et al., 1999).  Note that blame attribution should be considered a product of 
cognitive processes and a distortion in itself (Burns, 1999).  The literature on sexual 
offenses clearly supports the role of cognitions in justifying, planning, carrying out, 
rationalizing, and perpetuating deviant sexual behavior (Ward, Hudson, Johnston, & 
Marshall, 1997).   
In addition to sexual offenders, the psychological literature has identified the 
presence of cognitive distortions in other populations, one of which is children and 
adolescents.  Mobini, Pearce, Grant, Mills and Yeomans (2006) hypothesized that 
cognitive distortions mediate “behavioral undercontrol, emotional dysregulation and 
executive cognitive capacity” (p. 125), what these authors referred to as neurobehavior 
disinhibition.  Specifically, the authors examined the aforementioned relationship as it 
COGNITIVE DISTORTIONS, SCHEMA AND HOPELESSNESS 
 
37 
related to substance use in adolescence and adulthood.  They assessed affect regulation, 
behavior undercontrol, executive cognitive functioning, distorted thinking, and drug and 
alcohol use in subjects from childhood through adolescence.  Parents were also assessed 
for antisocial behavior and substance use.  Results suggested that cognitive distortions 
mediated neurobehavior disinhibition in late childhood, as well as the frequency of 
cannabis use in midadolescence.  Distorted thinking predicted prerequisite behaviors for 
substance use disorder (e.g., impulsivity).  The results here are consistent with Alford and 
Beck’s (1997) notion that information processing interacts with cognition to affect 
systems of behavior, emotion, attention, and memory.   
Other authors have found similar results with adolescent populations.  Barriga et 
al. (2000) examined the relationship between cognitive distortions and problem behaviors 
in adolescents.  The authors hypothesized that 96 incarcerated male (n = 46) and female 
(n = 50) adolescents, aged 13 to 19 years, would score higher on distortions categorized 
as self-debasing (i.e., Catastrophizing, Overgeneralization, Personalization and Selective 
Abstraction) or self-serving (i.e., Self-Centered, Blaming Others, 
Minimizing/Mislabeling, Assuming the Worst) than would a group of 66 public-high- 
school students.   Additionally, self-debasing distortions would be more strongly related 
to internalizing behavior and self-serving distortions to externalizing behavior.  Results 
suggested that self-serving and self-debasing cognitive distortions were more prevalent 
among incarcerated versus nonincarcerated high-school adolescents.  Furthermore, the 
evidence suggested possible differences in information processing as it related to 
internalizing and externalizing problems.  Specifically, self-serving cognitive distortions 
were associated with externalizing behaviors, while self-debasing distortions were 
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associated with internalizing behaviors.  As in other studies of cognitive distortions, 
cognitive distortions in Barriga et al.’s study appear a significant factor in youth 
psychopathology.   
Other authors have found evidence of cognitive distortions in internalizing 
disorders as well.  Kendall, Stark, and Adam (1990) conducted three studies that 
examined the role of cognitive deficits (i.e., deficit in active information processing, 
which is the inability to process information efficiently) and cognitive distortions (i.e., 
distorted processing that may be corrected) in childhood depression.  Past studies (see 
Kendall & Braswell, 1985) suggested that mixed findings may have been the result of 
variations in methodology.  In Study 1, subjects were 47 sixth-grade children who were 
assessed for information-processing deficits, self-evaluative cognitive distortions, and 
depression.  Study 2 was conducted to replicate the results of Study 1 with a younger 
population of children (n = 38 children).  Study 3 was conducted to further evaluate the 
nature of the subjects’ distorted thinking by having subjects’ homeroom teachers assess 
subjects’ self-evaluative cognitive distortions.  Results from all three studies suggested 
that children’s depression was related to a negative self-evaluation, rather than to a deficit 
in active information processing, concluding that the most efficacious treatment of 
childhood depression would involve teaching children skills to identify and replace 
maladaptive, distorted cognitions.   
In addition to the body of literature on children’s internalizing and externalizing 
disorders, evidence for cognitive distortions has been identified in medical populations. 
In one study, Farrell, Haines, Davies, Smith and Parton (2004) examined the role of 
cognitive distortions and stress in treatment adherence in child and adolescent subjects 
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diagnosed with Type I diabetes.  Subjects (n = 143) aged 11-18 years were measured for 
cognitive distortions, stress and adherence behavior.  Results suggested a positive 
relationship between cognitive distortions and stress, as well as between stress levels and 
adherence behavior.  Although researchers did not find a direct path between distorted 
thinking and adherence behavior, data did suggest an indirect relationship.   
Other authors have found similar connections between chronic medical conditions 
and distorted thinking.  Lefebvre (1981) examined the cognitive content of 89 subjects 
with chronic low-back pain.  Subjects needed to meet criteria for one of four groups, 
which were (a) depressed/pain, (b) nondepressed/pain, (c) depressed/nonpain and (d) 
nondepressed/nonpain.  Participants were assessed for cognitive distortions, pain, 
cognitive distortions specifically related to pain, and depression.  Results suggested that 
similar levels of general cognitive distortions were present in the depressed with and 
without pain groups compared with nondepressed subjects.  Authors concluded that 
whether triggered by pain or not, people with depression tend to exhibit global and 
pervasive cognitive distortions.  This finding is in line with Beck et al.’s (1979) theory of 
distorted thinking in depression.  In addition, depressed/pain subjects endorsed items 
more strongly than did depressed/nonpain subjects, which suggested a potential 
interaction between depression and pain in these subjects and that pain may play a critical 
role in the way they perceive their depression (Lefebvre, 1981).  Authors went further to 
suggest that content variables might be important determinants of the strength of the 
cognitive distortion.  Therefore, a cognitive-based therapy is justified in the treatment of 
individuals with low back pain.   
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Other authors have also examined the role of cognitive distortions in low back 
pain.  Smith, Follick, Ahern, and Adams (1986) examined the role of cognitive 
distortions and disability in subjects with chronic low back pain.  Subjects were 90 men 
and 48 women determined by a multidisciplinary team to have chronic low-back pain 
resulting from prior back injury.  Authors found a correlation between measures of 
cognitive distortions and disability scores.  The distortion of Overgeneralization was 
particularly strongly related to disability.  Authors suggested that this distortion may 
serve to exacerbate individuals’ perceptions of disability as they relate to different areas 
of their lives.  That is, patients may overgeneralize true behavioral deficits in one area 
(e.g., can no longer work in construction because of severe back pain) to behaviors in 
other areas that are not affected by their disability (e.g., belief that they cannot ever work 
in any capacity).  In this sense, the distortion serves to reinforce and maintain the 
person’s disability status.           
Smith, Christensen, Peck, and Ward (1994) examined the relationship among 
cognitive distortions, helplessness, and depression in 92 subjects diagnosed with 
rheumatoid arthritis (RA).  Results indicated that pain-related and general cognitive 
distortions and helplessness were significantly correlated with depressed mood.  
Moreover, the initial presence of cognitive distortions and perceived helplessness 
predicted increased levels of depression at 4-year follow-up in subjects diagnosed with 
RA.  Patients in the group with RA who initially endorsed the distortions of 
Overgeneralization, Selective Abstraction, Personalization and Catastrophizing were at 
higher risk for developing depression at 4-year follow-up.   
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In addition to their role in populations with chronic pain, cognitive distortions 
have been implicated in the decision-making processes of problem gamblers.  Toneatto, 
Blitz-Miller, Calderwood, Dragonetti, and Tsanos (1997) conducted qualitative analysis 
to identify regular gamblers’ beliefs about increasing probability outcomes.  Subjects 
were 38 regular gamblers (i.e., 100 dollars monthly or one time a week) who were 
recruited through a newspaper advertisement.  Subjects were interviewed in an open-
ended format about their attitudes and beliefs regarding gambling habits, and all 
interviews were audiotaped and transcribed.  Authors identified 13 cognitive distortions 
that fell under cognitive distortion categories related to predicting outcomes, reframing 
the meaning of outcomes, and engaging in behaviors that influence chance outcomes.  
Authors also added two categories, which related to aligning with variables affecting 
outcomes (i.e., superstitions) and making statistical judgments.  Inter-rater reliability was 
75% for identifying distortions, and 25% discrepancy was resolved by consensus.  
Subjects were also given the opportunity to complete the South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS) at the end of their interview.  Despite the methodological limitations of this 
study (i.e., sample size, subject selection, nonexperimental, unstructured interviewing), 
authors’ findings were consistent with prior studies with students and social gamblers 
(see Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Griffiths, 1994).  Particularly, a significant proportion 
of subjects made active attempts to influence the outcomes of their gambling through 
superstitious thinking and behaviors, the development of systems, or exaggerated self-
confidence.  Cognitive distortions were significantly more prominent in subjects who had 
a family history of problem gambling.  Lastly, scores in the significant range on the 
SOGS were positively correlated to having more cognitive distortions.  Overall, data 
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suggest a significant cognitive component in adult problem gamblers; however, more 
research is needed to confirm this notion (Toneatto et al., 1997).   
Freeman et al. (2004) identified a number of cognitive distortions in anxiety 
disorders.  Conceptualized through Beck’s cognitive theory of psychopathology, the 
thinking of individuals with anxiety disorders is characterized by themes of threat and 
danger.  The distortions of Catastrophizing, Selective Abstraction, Overgeneralization, 
Magnification/Minimization and Arbitrary Inference are common.  Anxious individuals 
tend to believe that worrying and rumination are effective responses to perceived possible 
danger or threat, that perfectionism minimizes threat or danger, and that avoiding is 
easier than facing life’s difficulties (Zwemer & Deffenbacher, 1984).   
Deffenbacher, Zwemer, Whisman, Hill, and Sloan (1986) also found different 
cognitive distortions predictive of different anxiety disorders.  The data on cognitive 
distortions in emotional disorders are clear and pervasive throughout the literature.  
Currently, there is evidence of cognitive distortions across disorders and populations, 
including internalizing (i.e., anxiety and depressive disorders) and externalizing disorders 
(i.e., conduct and behavior disorders); adults, children, and adolescents; populations with 
chronic pain; problem gamblers; and sex offenders.  Cognitive distortions likely will 
continue to be implicated in emotional disorders as new measures are developed (Yurica 
& DiTomasso, 2002).  The following section reviews a number of current measures of 
cognitive distortions. 
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Measures of Cognitive Distortions 
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD) 
The ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2002) is a 69-item self-report scale that measures 
the frequency of an individual’s systematic errors in logical thinking, or cognitive 
distortions.  Items consist of short sentences that reflect types of distorted thinking.  
Individual responses are chosen from a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., Never, Rarely, 
Sometimes, Often, Always), and response values range from 1 = Never to 5 = Always.   
The range of possible scores on the ICD is from 69 to 345.  Higher scores indicate higher 
frequencies of distorted thinking, while lower scores indicate lower frequencies.   
Regarding the instrument’s reliability and validity, the ICD has shown 
satisfactory construct validity.  Factor analysis revealed 11 factors that closely resembled 
10 theory-derived cognitive distortion subscales (i.e., Externalization of Self-Worth, 
Fortune-Telling, Magnification, Labeling, Perfectionism, Comparison to Others, 
Emotional Reasoning, Arbitrary Inference/Jumping to Conclusion, Minimization, and 
Mind-Reading), in addition to one nontheory-derived cognitive distortion subscale, which 
was labeled Emotional Reasoning/Decision Making (Yurica, 2002).  Content validity was 
determined by a panel of three cognitive therapy experts, all of whom agreed 
unequivocally on the validity of the original 69 items.  Test-retest reliability indicated 
very strong consistency over time, with total scores of .998 (n = 28, p < .0001).   
Concurrent validity was good, and the ICD was significantly correlated with 
measures of negative thinking, depression, and anxiety, which will be explained briefly 
later.  The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) was designed to measure a depressed 
person’s negative attitudes toward self, world, and others.  Items on the ICD were shown 
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to be positively and significantly correlated to negative attitudes (r = .70, n = 159, p < 
.0001).  The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) 
are measures of depression and anxiety symptoms, respectively.  The ICD was positively 
and significantly correlated with both of these instruments (r = .70, n = 161, p < .0001; r 
= .59, n = 161, p < .0001, respectively; Yurica, 2002). 
Yurica (2002) also found the ICD to have strong criterion validity.  Her sample 
consisted of clinical (n = 122) and non-clinical (n = 66) participants, and the ICD was 
able to significantly distinguish between the two groups (F = 15.2, df = 169, p < .0001).  
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) 
 The DAS (Weissman & Beck, 1978) is a 40-item self-report designed to measure 
the dysfunctional thinking of depressed individuals.  Items are single-sentence statements 
that are answered on a 7-point Likert scale.  The instrument provides a global score with 
a possible range from 40 to 280, with higher scores indicating higher degrees of 
dysfunctional thinking.  Yurica (2002) reported good internal consistency with alphas 
ranging from .84 - .92, good test-retest correlations from .80 - .84, and excellent 
concurrent validity.  In addition, the DAS has been correlated with other measures of 
depression and dysfunctional thinking and has been used widely in psychological 
research to measure dysfunctional attitudes in depression.        
Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CEQ) 
 The CEQ (Lefebvre, 1981) is a 24-item, self-report questionnaire developed to 
measure cognitive errors.  The scale measures four prominent cognitive distortions in the 
psychological literature, which are Catastrophizing, Overgeneralization, Personalization, 
and Selective Abstraction.  CEQ items are comprised of short vignettes of ordinary 
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situations in a variety of contexts that are followed by a cognition that embodies a 
common cognitive distortion.  Using a 5-point scale, subjects are asked to rate how 
closely their own thinking would reflect the given distorted statement.   
 Test-retest reliability (.80 - .85), alternative-forms reliability (.76 - .82) and 
internal consistency (.89 - .92) are high.  Regarding concurrent validity, the measure has 
been moderately correlated with the Hammen and Krantz (1976) Depressed-Distorted 
Scale (.53 - .60).   
Low Back Pain Cognitive Error Questionnaire (LBP-CEQ) 
 The LBP-CEQ (Lefebvre, 1981) is a 24-item, self-report questionnaire developed 
to measure cognitive errors in subjects with low back pain.  The scale measures four 
prominent cognitive distortions in the psychological literature, which are Catastrophizing, 
Overgeneralization, Personalization and Selective Abstraction.  CEQ items are comprised 
of short vignettes of ordinary situations in a variety of contexts that are followed by a 
cognition that embodies a common cognitive distortion.  However, unlike the CEQ, the 
LBP-CEQ’s items focus on situations related to “a problem, personal limitation or 
interpretation related to an individual with a back disorder” (p. 518).  Using a 5-point 
scale, subjects are asked to rate how closely their own thinking would reflect the given 
distorted statement.   
 LBP-CEQ test-retest reliability (.80 - .85), alternative-forms reliability (.76 - .82) 
and internal consistency (.89 - .92) are reported high.  Like the CEQ, the LBP-CEQ has 
been moderately correlated with the Hammen and Krantz (1976) Depressed-Distorted 
Scale (.53 - .60).     
Cognitive Distortion Scale (CDS) 
 46 
 The CDS (Najavits, 1993) is a 12-item measure designed to identify common 
cognitive distortions in individuals with dual diagnoses of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) and a substance use disorder (SUD).  Items are scaled on a subjective units of 
distress scale (SUDS) from 0 (not at all) to 100 (all the time). 
 The CDS measures 12 distortions which are (a) The Escape, (b) Beating Yourself 
Up, (c) Dangerous Permission, (d) Time Warp, (e) Short-Term Thinking, (f) Fooling 
Yourself, (g) Confusing Needs and Wants, (h) The Good Old Days, (i) Overreacting, (j) 
Deprivation Reasoning, (k) Instant Satisfaction and (l) Rose Colored Glasses (Najavits, 
Gotthardt, Weiss, & Epstein, 2004).   
Intercorrelations between CDS items suggest low convergent validity (range, .03 
– .51).  Internal consistency of the measure was high, with an alpha of .93.  A principal 
components analysis identified a three-factor solution, which were cognitive 
rationalization, affective conflict, and time distortion and represented 60% of total 
variance.  The CDS successfully differentiated a dual-diagnosis group (PTSD/SUD) from 
a single diagnosis group (PTSD only) of 92 adult female subjects.  Overall, the 
psychometrics of the CDS suggest that this measure is adequate for distinguishing female 
patients with dual diagnosis PTSD and SUD from female patients with PTSD only, as 
well as for distinguishing common cognitive distortions among these individuals 
(Najavits et al., 2004).                 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATS and ATS-R) 
 The ATS (Hollon & Kendall, 1980) is a 30-item self-report designed to measure 
the cognitive self-statements of depressed adults and children (Kazdin, 1990).  Items are 
scored on a scale from “not at all” to “all the time,” and total scores are the sum of all 30 
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items.  Yurica (2002) noted the ATS has been correlated with the BDI-II, the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) Depression Scale, and the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI) A-Trait Scale.  The ATS has been used with clinical populations and 
successfully distinguished between depressed and non-depressed subjects.  The ATS has 
shown moderate to high construct validity (r’s from .45 - .87).           
The Abel and Becker Cognition Scale (ABCS) 
The ABCS (Abel et al., 1989) is a 29-item self-report designed to measure the 
cognitive distortions of child molesters.  Items are scored on a 5-point Likert scale with 
lower scores indicating greater distortion.  The ABCS was found to have acceptable to 
good internal consistency, with alphas ranging from .59 - .82.  Test-retest reliability was 
examined and determined to be acceptable for the six individual factors (correlations 
from .59 - .82), as well as for the entire scale (correlation of .76).  Data suggested that the 
ABCS was able to discriminate child molesters from the general population and that the 
number of years engaged in molesting behavior was positively correlated to the number 
of distortions endorsed.  Overall, authors concluded that the scale was an accurate 
measure of cognitive distortions in child molesters.         
Note that authors indicated the ABCS to be “transparent” (p. 140), and no 
attempts were made to disguise the nature or purpose of the instrument during 
development.  Other authors (see Blumenthal et al., 1999) have raised concern over 
response bias via positive impression management.  Other authors have found similar 
results (see Langevin, 1991).             
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Survey of Personal Beliefs (SPB) 
 The SPB (Demaria, Kassinove & Dill, 1989) is a 50-item self-report grounded in 
rational emotive theory (Ellis, 1958) that measures cognitive distortions.  Items are 
scored on a 6-point Likert scale, with lower scores indicating greater distortion.  
Confirmitory factor analysis of the SPB identified five factors, which were Awfulizing, 
Low Frustration Tolerance, Self-Directed Dictatorial Shoulds, Other-Directed Shoulds, 
and Self-Worth (alphas ranged from .57 - .72).  Limited support was found for the SPB’s 
ability to discriminate anxiety and depression in a sample of college students.  Only three 
of the five scales (i.e., Other-Directed Shoulds, Low Frustration Tolerance, and Self-
Worth) were significantly correlated with measures of psychological symptoms.  Other-
Directed Shoulds was negatively correlated with anxiety symptoms, that is, greater 
distortion was associated with less anxiety (Chang & D’Zurilla, 1996).  These results are 
in contrast to Nottingham (1992), who found moderate correlations between the SPB and 
measures of depression and anxiety in an inpatient population, which suggests possible 
sampling bias.   
Steel, Moller, Cardenas, and Smith (2006) compared South African, Mexican, and 
American college student samples in order to examine the cross-cultural reliability of the 
SPB.  Results indicated a significant effect for culture, which authors suggested could 
reflect real differences in distorted thinking across cultures or insufficient cross-cultural 
reliability of the SPB.  
 Overall, the psychometric research of the SPB suggests problems with validity 
and reliability, which raises questions about its effectiveness in clinical settings.  Thus, 
further research is warranted on the SPB.                
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Molest Scale/Rape Scale 
 The 38-item Molest and 36-item Rape Scales (Bumby, 1996) are both self-report 
measures of cognitive distortions of child molesters and rapists, respectively.  Items are 
answered via a 4-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from “strongly agree” to 
“strongly disagree.”  Responses on both scales are summed to provide a total score, with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of distorted thinking.  The Molest and Rape Scales 
measure cognitive distortions related to Justification, Minimization, Rationalization and 
Excuses commonly used by individuals who molest children or sexually assault women. 
The Molest Scale showed excellent internal consistency (alpha of .97) and good 
test-retest reliability (r = .84; p < .001) over a 2-week interval.  The Molest Scale was 
positively correlated with other measures of cognitive distortions of sex offenders, 
including the Cognitive Distortion/Immaturity Subscale of the Multiphasic Sex Inventory 
(MSI) and the ABCS.  The Molest Scale also correlated with the Lie Scale on the MSI.  
The Molest Scale showed the ability to discriminate between incarcerated child 
molesters, rapists, and nonsexual offender controls.   
The Molest Scale was not significantly correlated with the Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, which suggests that the measure is free from a social 
desirability response bias (i.e., exaggerating socially acceptable behavior and minimizing 
behaviors that conflict with social norms).   
The psychometrics of the Rape Scale were also measured.  Authors found that the 
measure showed excellent internal consistency (alpha of .96) and good test-retest 
reliability (r = .86; p < .001) over a 2-week interval.  The measure was significantly 
correlated with other measures of cognitive distortions of sex offenders, including the 
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Cognitive Distortion/Immaturity Subscale of the MSI, which indicates the construct and 
convergent validity of the instrument.   
Like the Molest Scale, the Rape Scale was found to be is free from a social 
desirability response bias.  The instrument successfully discriminated rapists from 
incarcerated child molesters and nonsexual offender controls. 
Authors also used the measures in the context of sexual offender treatment that 
included a cognitive restructuring element.  Results indicated a decrease in the cognitive 
distortions of both rapists and child molesters over two 3-month intervals.  This decrease 
suggests the efficacy of these scales in clinical settings that address sexual offender 
treatment. 
Negative Cognitive Errors in Children Questionnaire (CNCEQ) 
The CNCEQ (Leitenberg et al., 1986) is a 24-item, self-report questionnaire 
designed to measure Beck’s (1967) original cognitive distortions in children.  The 
measure is modeled after Lefebvre’s (1981) Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire in 
that it utilizes vignettes related to different contexts (e.g., social, athletic, academic).  The 
measure examines the distortions of Catastrophizing, Overgeneralizing, Personalization,, 
and Selective Abstraction.  Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not at 
all like I would think” to “almost exactly like I would think.”  A total cognitive distortion 
score is arrived at by computing the total endorsements.  The measure has a possible 
range of scores from 24 to 120, with higher scores indicating higher numbers of 
distortions.     
 Preliminary psychometric data suggested test-retest reliability to be adequate, but 
low (r = .65; p < .001; Leitenberg, et al., 1986).  Internal consistency of the CNCEQ was 
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found to be adequate to good, with alphas ranging from .60-.82 for the subscales and .89 
for the full scale in a sample of normal children (Robins & Hinkley, 1989).  In a sample 
of fourth- to eighth-grade children, low self-esteem, depression, and evaluative anxiety 
were correlated with the CNCEQ’s total score and the distortion of Overgeneralization 
(Leitenberg et al., 1986).   
How I Think Questionnaire (HIT) 
 The HIT (Gibbs, Barriga, & Potter, 2001) is a 63-item self-report instrument used 
to measure cognitive distortions of 13- to 20-year-olds who exhibit one of four categories 
of antisocial behaviors, which are (a) stealing, (b) lying, (c) physical aggression, and (d) 
disrespect for rules, laws, and authority.  Of the 63 items, 43 represent self-serving 
distortions (e.g., if someone is careless enough to lose his or her wallet, he or she 
deserves to have it stolen) and 20 are control items.  Twelve of the 20 control items are 
designed to determine potential impression management via inconsistent or unlikely 
responses, while the additional eight are items related to prosocial behavior to 
camouflage the distortion items.   Items are scored on a 6-point Likert scale that ranges 
from “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly” (Barriga et al., 2000).           
 Initial psychometric data of the HIT indicated high test-retest reliability (r = .91; p 
< .001), suggesting that the measure performed similarly with respondents at different 
periods in time.  Internal consistency for the HIT measure was high (alphas ranging from 
.93- .96; Barriga & Gibbs, 1996).     
 The HIT correlated with the Externalizing Scale of the Youth Self-Report Form (r 
= .55; p < .001) and the Nye-Short Self-Reported Delinquency Questionnaire (r = .36; p 
< .0001), which suggested that the measure has adequate construct validity.  In addition, 
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correlations between the cognitive distortion subscales and antisocial behavior on the 
aforementioned scales was significant (r’s ranged from .23-.55).  Cognitive distortions 
correlated highly with the overall HIT (r’s ranged from .87-.92; Barriga & Gibbs, 1996).   
 The HIT was only partially successful at discriminating among criterion groups, 
which were (a) 55 incarcerated male adolescent delinquents, (b) 50 male adolescents 
from an urban working-class high-school in Grades 10 through 12, and (c) 42 male 
adolescents in Grades 10 to 12 from a suburban upper-middle-class public high school.  
This partial success is concerning for the measure considering that the incarcerated group 
was adjudicated for felonies including robbery, rape, and murder.  To the measure’s 
defense, the Blaming Others subscale did successfully discriminate group (a) from groups 
(b) and (c).  However, group (b), like group (c), reported low levels of delinquent 
behavior, but group (b) reported distortions equal to those of group (a).  Authors 
explained this discrepancy through potential group differences owing to impression 
management (Barriga & Gibbs, 1996).  Other studies have shown that the HIT effectively 
discriminated court-referred and hospitalized externalizing adolescents from urban high-
school students (Barriga et al., 2000).                    
Bulimia Cognitive Distortions Scale (BCDS) 
 The BCDS (Schulman, Kinder, Powers, Prange, & Gleghorn, 1986) is a 25-item, 
self-report measure of cognitive distortions characteristic of individuals with bulimia 
nervosa.  Items are scored on a 5-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree.”  A total score is obtained by adding the responses to each of the 25 
items, with a possible range of scores from 25 to 125, with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of distorted thinking.   
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 Internal consistency between BCDS items was good, with 16 of the 25 items 
correlating .75 or better and no correlation lower than .60.  The measure had a coefficient 
alpha of .97 in further support of its good internal consistency (Schulman et al., 1986).   
 Factor analysis revealed a two-factor solution that accounted for 100% of the 
variance.  Authors identified first factor as cognitive distortions related to automatic 
eating behaviors (91% of total variance), while the second factor was cognitive 
distortions related to physical appearance (9% of the total variance; Schulman et al., 
1986).   
 The BCDS correlated with the Demand for Approval (r = .63; p < .001) and High 
Self-Expectations (r = .58; p < .0001) subtests of the Irrational Beliefs Test.  It was also 
significantly correlated with the BDI-II (r = .77; p < .0001).  Contrary to expectations, the 
Bizarre Sensory Experiences (BSE) subscale of the MMPI was not significantly 
correlated with bulimic subjects (r = .19; Schulman et al., 1986). 
The BCDS was shown to have good predictive validity and successfully 
discriminated subjects with bulimia from a non-clinical college population, F (1, 108) = 
262.9, p < .0001.  The measure accurately predicted 100% of the nonclinical college 
sample and 87.3% of the sample with bulimia.  Additionally, the measure was able to 
discriminate levels of severity of bulimia in subjects as measured by the frequency of 
binge-eating episodes.  No data on test-retest reliability for the measure were provided by 
authors (Schulman et al., 1986).     
Limitations of Measures of Cognitive Distortions 
 Yurica (2002) identified a number of limitations of measures of cognitive 
distortions.  First, there is a lack of consistency in definitions of various distortions.  For 
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instance, on the CDS, Najavits (1993) referred to “Overreacting,” while “Jumping to 
Conclusions” is used on the ICD and “Catastrophizing” on the LBP-CEQ.  Though these 
distortions appear to be measuring the same construct (i.e., anticipating the most negative 
conclusion), a lack of consistent terminology and definitions for cognitive distortions 
interferes with their accurate measurement (Yurica, 2002).   
 A second drawback to measures of cognitive distortions is that they are often 
derived from research on negative thought patterns in specific disorders and populations 
rather than on the general underlying processes of distorted cognition.  This adds further 
confusion to the measurement of cognitive distortions.  For instance, Yurica (2002) 
pointed out how the DAS and CEQ were designed to assess cognitive distortions in 
depression, which limits their applicability in clinical contexts.  Additionally, many 
measures that provide a total score, like the DAS, fail to categorize and identify specific 
types of distortions that may be beneficial to psychological treatment.  An exception to 
this is the ICD, which does provide more standardized, specific information on 
distortions present in a variety of psychological disorders.  
Hopelessness 
Alford & Beck’s (1997) cognitive theory espoused that cognitive schemas help 
individuals make meaning of experience and generate core beliefs that drive 
environmental, interpersonal, emotional, and behavioral adaptation.  When cognition 
interacts with schema, it aids the development of patterned emotional, attentional, 
memory, and behavioral activity, which Beck referred to as “cognitive content 
specificity” (p. 16).  Each psychological disorder can be characterized by the cognitive 
content of the individual.  Psychopathology in depression is believed to result from 
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maladaptive assignment of negative meaning to the self, world, and future, which are 
described as the cognitive triad.  The assignment of negative meaning to the future has 
been characterized to represent hopelessness.  Currently, two major theories to explain 
hopelessness and its relationship to emotional disorders.  They are cognitive theory of 
depression (Beck, 2002; Beck et al., 1979) and hopelessness theory of depression 
(Abramson et al., 1989).  Currently, evidence associates hopelessness with mood 
disorders and suicide and suggests that hopelessness should be an important focus of the 
treatment of individuals in clinical settings (Beck, Brown, Berchick, Stewart, & Steer, 
1990; Beck, Riskind, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  Lastly, measures designed to assess 
hopelessness in child and adult populations will be reviewed.     
Definitions of hopelessness 
 Beck (2002) characterized the negative view of the future and self that is evident 
in individuals with depression by both (a) hopelessness, or negative expectations about 
the future, and (b) helplessness, or one’s belief that one lacks the capability to affect 
future outcomes (Henkel, Bussfeld, Moller, & Hegerl, 2002; Stotland, 1969).  Abramson 
et al. (1989) defined hopelessness as the “expectation that highly valued outcomes will 
not occur or that highly aversive outcomes will occur (i.e., hopelessness) coupled with an 
expectation that no response in one’s repertoire will change the likelihood of occurrence 
of these outcomes” (p. 359).  Therefore, researchers generally agreed that hopelessness 
consists of thoughts about both the future and whether or not the individual believes he or 
she can alter future events.    
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Theories of hopelessness 
Beck’s theory of depression 
 Beck’s (Beck et al., 1979) cognitive theory of depression utilizes a cognitive 
diathesis-stress model to explain the onset and maintenance of depression.  Diathesis-
stress models explain the emergence and maintenance of psychopathology as the 
interaction between stress, or negative life events, and genetic variables.  Selye (1963) 
viewed stress as an event that taxes an individual’s ability to adapt significantly enough 
to cause changes in daily functioning.  He also found that stress created identifiable and 
measurable changes in the brain and body.  However, though stress is considered one 
variable in the onset of depression, many people who encounter life stress will not 
experience symptoms of depression.   
Caspi et al. (2003) identified a gene that appears to moderate the influence of 
stressful events on depression, which suggests that sensitivity to life stress is contingent 
on an individual’s genetic make-up.  Therefore, the diathesis (i.e., genetic predisposition) 
mediates an individual’s reaction to stressful events.  The diathesis-stress model espouses 
that individuals have a genetic predisposition that makes the development of particular 
disorders more probable (diathesis), with each individual having different stress 
thresholds for when a disorder might emerge (Ingram & Luxton, 2005).     
In Beck’s (Beck et al., 1979) diathesis-stress model of depression, the diathesis is 
cognitive.  His theory espouses that depression is characterized by a negative systematic 
bias in an individual’s interpretation of his or her experiences (i.e., information 
processing).  Beck and Clark (1988) explained the cognitive diathesis in depression with 
the cognitive triad, which is characterized by themes of loss and deprivation.  Cognitive 
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content of individuals with depression, generated by early maladaptive schemas, focuses 
on views of the self as “inadequate, deprived and worthless” (p.26), views of the world as 
“presenting insurmountable obstacles” (p. 26), and views of the future as “utterly bleak 
and hopeless” (p. 26).  This negative view of the future and self encapsulate 
hopelessness, which drives an individual’s expectation that negative events will occur 
and that he or she will not be able to affect those negative outcomes, respectively (Henkel 
et al., 2002).                   
When faced with environmental stress, a cognitive diathesis manifests in the 
cognitive triad, which, in turn, gives way to symptoms of depression (e.g., sadness).  In 
the absence of stress, the cognitive diathesis is believed to lie dormant and is therefore 
less likely to lead to depressive symptoms.  The cognitive diathesis and stress are 
theorized to be distal variables (i.e., at the beginning of the causal chain) in the onset of 
depression.  Hopelessness, or a depressed individual’s negative view of the future, is 
thought to be a sufficient proximal cause (i.e., late in the causal pathway and guarantee 
the expression of symptoms) of depression and is considered to have a mediating effect 
on depressive symptomatology (Dixon, Heppner, Burnett, & Lips, 1993). 
 Haaga et al. (1991) reviewed several components of Beck’s cognitive theory of 
depression: negativity, exclusivity, triad, automaticity, universality, necessity, specificity, 
association with noncognitive symptoms and information processing biases or distortions.  
Each component is addressed in the following list.   
1. Negativity refers to the cognitive valence of the thinking of the person with 
depression.  Evidence has consistently shown that individuals with depression 
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score higher on measures of negative thinking than do nondepressed individuals 
(Haaga et al., 1991).   
2. Exclusivity refers to the prediction that individuals with depression experience 
only negative and neutrally valenced cognitions and no positive cognitions.  Little 
support for this absence of positive cognitions exists in the literature, with most 
studies supporting the presence of both positive and negative thoughts (Haaga et 
al., 1991).   
3. The cognitive triad refers to the depressed individual’s maladaptive assignment of 
negative meaning to the self, world, and future.  Strong evidence shows that 
subjects who are depressed think more negatively about themselves, the world, 
and the future than do nondepressed subjects.  Subjects with depression also 
endorse more hopelessness about the future than nondepressed and remitted 
subjects do (Haaga et al., 1991).  Hopelessness was found to be unique to subjects 
with depression, who rate negative outcomes as more likely to occur and positive 
outcomes as less likely.  
4. Automaticity refers to the automatic nature of information processing in 
depression, and currently, not enough research has been done to suggest its role in 
individuals with depression (Haaga et al., 1991).    
5. Universality refers to the presence of negative view of self, world, and future 
across different depressive disorders.  Evidence supports the universality of the 
cognitive triad in unipolar, bipolar, primary, secondary, endogenous and 
nonendogenous, and melancholic and nonmelancholic depressions.  Therefore, 
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depression has a similar presentation regardless of the disorder (e.g., Bipolar 
Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder; Haaga et al., 1991). 
6. Necessity refers to all individuals with depression exhibiting the cognitive triad.  
Haaga et al. (1991) highlighted hopelessness studies that suggest that subjects 
who have depression do not always have a negative view of the future.  The 
cognitive theory of depression suggests that only one component of the triad is a 
necessary condition for depression.  Whether all depressed individuals experience 
at least one triad component is not currently known.   
7. Specificity refers to the depressive profile of negativity and loss particular to 
depressive disorders.  Empirical evidence is mixed on cognitive specificity in 
depression.  Haaga et al. (1991) indicated that in most studies, patients with 
depression (a) had greater numbers of negative cognitions, (b) had more negative 
self-concept, (c) used fewer positively valenced adjectives to describe themselves, 
(d) were more hopeless, and (e) endorsed more negative adjectives about the 
world than did psychiatric controls.  Additionally, when compared with subjects 
with anxiety, subjects with depression exhibited more aspects of the cognitive 
triad. 
8. Association with noncognitive symptoms refers to the relationship between 
cognitions and emotional and behavioral symptoms of depression (e.g., fatigue, 
sleep disturbance, suicidal behavior).  Even when controlling for depression, the 
cognitive symptom of hopelessness has been shown repeatedly to be significantly 
correlated with suicidal behavior (Haaga et al., 1991). 
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9. Information processing biases or distortions relates to cognitive theory’s ability to 
distinguish between an information processing bias (i.e., automatic tendency to 
selectively focus on the negative aspects of one’s experience) and distorted 
thinking (e.g., systematic errors in thinking that derive from the information 
processing bias, such as Dichotomous Thinking and Arbitrary Inference).  In their 
review Haaga et al. (1991) did not find sufficient data to suggest that the theory 
effectively differentiated between the two constructs.  Clark et al. (1999) explain 
this finding by referring to the information processing bias in depression as a 
cognitive shift where as a person becomes depressed, they move from encoding 
environmental stimuli in a positive or neutral manner to a negative one.  The 
result is thinking that is characterized by systematic thinking errors or cognitive 
distortions.  Therefore, the bias refers to an underlying process shift or orientation 
that negatively distorts one’s thoughts.    
Abramson et al.’s theory of Hopelessness Depression 
 Hopelessness theory is similar to Beck’s theory of depression in a number of 
ways.  First, it is based on a cognitive diathesis-stress model, which espouses an 
interaction between cognitive variables and environmental stressors.  Second, it identifies 
both distal and proximal causes that lead to depressive symptoms.  Third, both theories 
espouse a cognitive diathesis that contributes to the development of hopelessness.  
Hopelessness theory diverges from cognitive theory of depression, however, in how 
hopelessness and thus, hopelessness depression, is arrived at. 
Abramson et al. (1989) based hopelessness theory on Abramson, Seligman, and 
Teasdale’s (1978) theory of helplessness and depression.  Hopelessness theory is an 
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updated theory based on current research on clinical depression.  The theory can be 
thought of as a chain of causal events, each with differing influence on the development 
of hopelessness and, thus, hopelessness depression, a hypothesized subtype of clinical 
depression.   
In the theory, hopelessness is described as a sufficient proximal cause of 
hopelessness depression.  That is, hopelessness appears at the end of the causal chain and 
guarantees the development of the depression subtype.  Hopelessness is arrived at 
through an interaction between (a) perceived negative life events/perceived lack of 
positive life events and (b) negative inferences about causes, consequences, and the self 
related to the perceived negative event.  In addition, authors theorized proximal 
contributory causes that increase the likelihood of becoming hopeless, but they are 
neither sufficient in themselves nor necessary for hopelessness to occur.   
A last contributory cause, cognitive style, is thought to occur at the beginning of 
the causal chain (i.e., distal) and serves as the diathesis in this model (Abramson et al., 
1989).  Authors suggested that individuals with a “depressogenic attributional style” 
(Abramson et al., 1989, p. 362) would be more prone to attribute negative causes to 
events and tend to view negative events as very important (Alloy & Clements, 1998).  An 
individual’s cognitive style is the diathesis in the diathesis-stress model and is thought to 
activate in the presence of perceived negative life events (i.e., stress).  This cognitive 
style is believed to have a negative relationship to perceived negative life events.  That is, 
the less negative the cognitive style, the greater the life event needed to lead to symptoms 
of hopelessness and, thus, hopelessness depression (Abramson et al., 1989). 
 62 
Empirical examinations of Abramson et al.’s theory of hopelessness depression 
provide partial evidence for proposed causal pathways.  Discrepancies may be the results 
of a number of factors, including the use of relatively healthy subjects in a number of 
studies, poor generalizability of undergraduate samples, interpretation of correlation as 
representing causality, and considerable overlap with Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM), 4
th
 ed., text rev. (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
symptoms of major depression (in the case of hopelessness theory; Henkel et al., 2002).    
With this stated, there is evidence for hopelessness depression in the 
psychological literature base.  For example, Alloy and Clements (1998) found that 
college students with a depressive cognitive style showed significantly higher rates of 
hopelessness depression symptoms (i.e., decreased motivation, sad affect, suicidal 
ideation/attempts, low energy, apathy, psychomotor retardation, sleep disturbance, poor 
concentration, low self-esteem, and dependency) than did student subjects without a 
depressive cognitive style.  Though this evidence is promising, many studies have failed 
to identify hopelessness depression by its hypothesized symptom profile (Joiner et al., 
2001; Spangler, Simons, Monroe, & Thase, 1993; Whisman, Miller, Norman, & Keitner, 
1995).  All have found partial, but not full, support for the symptoms, which may be the 
results of significant overlap in symptoms between hopelessness depression and major 
depression as outlined in the DSM-IV-TR (2000).   
Spangler et al. (1993) measured 57 outpatients being treated for mood disorders 
for attributional style, life stress, and depressive symptoms.  They hypothesized that 
hopelessness would be able to be identified by the diathesis-stress component and by 
Abramson et al.’s (1989) hypothesized symptom profile.  Authors found that subjects 
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who matched positive for depressogenic cognitive style and perceived negative life 
events had higher levels of hopelessness than did subjects who did not match on 
cognitive style and negative life events.  However, subjects could not to be identified by 
the hypothesized symptom profile for hopelessness depression.       
Regarding the mediational nature of hopelessness, which both Beck’s (2002) and 
Abramson et al.’s (1989) theories propose, research has shown little support.  Dixon et al. 
(1993) found that hopelessness moderated, not mediated, the relationship between stress 
and depression symptoms.  That is, hopelessness appeared to impact the strength of the 
relationship between stressful situations and depressive symptoms.   
Similarly, Gibb, Beevers, Andover, and Holleran (2006) examined Abramson’s 
hopelessness theory (1989) and found that cognitive style moderated the relationship 
between negative life events and symptoms of depression in 162 undergraduates.  That is, 
subjects who measured high for (a) attributing negative events to stable and global causes 
and (b) inferring negative outcomes to these events showed stronger depressive 
symptoms over the course of the study.     
Abela (2001) found that hopelessness did not mediate the interactions between 
cognitive style and perceived negative events in third-and seventh-grade samples.  
Finally, Gibb, Alloy, Abramson, and Marx (2003) found evidence for partial mediation of 
hopelessness in the relationship between cognitive style and hopelessness depression 
symptoms in a sample of college students.  This evidence suggests that hopelessness may 
be a variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the aforementioned relationships 
or that it may be one of a number of variables that mediate these relationships (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986).          
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Hopelessness and Psychopathology 
 According to Beck et al. (1988), hopelessness is specific to depression.  Though 
other authors (see Akiskal, Hirschfeld, and Yerevanian, 1983; Beck, Wenzel, Riskind, 
Brown & Steer, 2006; Stotland, 1969) have argued that hopelessness may be implicated 
in other disorders as well, the bulk of the research has suggested otherwise.  In their 
review of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression, Haaga et al. (1991) found strong 
evidence to support the relationship among depression, hopelessness, and suicide.  
Hopelessness was found to be more highly correlated with suicide than was depression 
(Minkoff et al., 1973), making hopelessness a better predictor than depression of eventual 
suicide. 
 One study (Minkoff et al., 1973) examined 68 hospitalized suicide attempters 
aged 14 to 63 years.  Of the 68 subjects, more than half (n = 45) were diagnosed with a 
depressive disorder, while the remainder (n = 23) were diagnosed with schizophrenia.  To 
be included in the sample, subjects had to have (a) shown intent to die and (b) followed 
through with a suicidal act, regardless of the severity of harm caused.  Subjects who had 
intent but stopped short of follow-through were excluded, as were those who self-
mutilated without intent to die, took accidental overdoses, and engaged in other self-
injurious behaviors.  Subjects were administered the BDI to measure severity of 
depression, the Suicide Intent Scale (SIS) to measure the seriousness of suicidal intent, 
and the Generalized Expectancies Scale (GES) to measure level of hopelessness.   
Authors found severity of depression and level of hopelessness to be significantly 
positively correlated.  That is, as depression severity increased, so did level of 
hopelessness.  Hopelessness was more highly correlated with seriousness of intent than 
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with severity of depression.  Regardless of subjects’ depression scores, high hopelessness 
scores had higher seriousness-of-intent scores.  Results were also examined according to 
diagnosis.  Subjects with depression showed significant correlations between severity of 
depression and seriousness of intent, but level of hopelessness was still more highly 
correlated with intent.  Subjects with schizophrenia showed a nonsignificant correlation 
between severity of depression and intent, but a significant correlation between 
hopelessness and intent.  Authors concluded that hopelessness was a more critical factor 
in suicide than was depression (Minkoff et al., 1973).   
Other studies have shown similar findings.  Kuo, Gallo, and Eaton (2004) used a 
longitudinal study to examine hopelessness and suicide behaviors at baseline and at 13-
year follow-up in 3,481 subjects.  Authors hypothesized that hopelessness would be a 
long-term predictor of suicidal behavior.  Suicidal behavior was defined as (a) completed 
suicide, (b) suicide attempts, and (c) suicidal ideation.  Like previous studies, results 
indicated that hopelessness was a stronger predictor of suicidal behavior than were 
depression or substance abuse disorders.  Hopelessness was significant for suicide 
completion, attempts, and ideation and was concluded to be a significant risk for suicide. 
 Beck, Steer, Kovacs, and Garrison (1985) studied hopelessness in 205 subjects 
hospitalized for suicidal ideation, but not for recent suicide attempts.  Subjects were 
selected based on whether they had “seriously thought about, planned or wished to 
commit suicide” (p. 560).  Subjects were assessed longitudinally at admission and at 5-
year follow-up.  Great lengths were taken to have periodic contact with subjects, either 
directly or indirectly, to assess status.  Subjects were administered the BDI, Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS) and The Scale for Suicide Ideation.   
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Authors (Beck et al., 1985) found that 14 of the participants had committed 
suicide by follow-up.  The BHS was the only scale that significantly distinguished suicide 
completers from noncompleters.  Higher scores of hopelessness (cutoff of 9) were more 
highly correlated with completers (90.9% had a score of 9 or above) than with 
noncompleters.  Severity of depression did not significantly differentiate completers from 
noncompleters, which supports similar past results (see Minkoff et al., 1973).  Authors 
concluded that hopelessness is a major component of suicidal behavior and that 
psychological interventions for hopelessness may be effective for reducing suicidal 
behaviors (Beck et al., 1985).  Most notable was that the BHS showed the ability to 
predict future suicide.  The link between hopelessness and depression and suicidal 
behavior is generally supported in the psychological literature.  
 Chochinov, Wilson, Enns, and Lander (1998) studied 198 subjects with advanced 
terminal cancer and found that hopelessness mediated the relationship between 
depression and suicidal ideation.  Suicidal ideation and depression were significantly 
correlated, as were suicidal ideation and hopelessness; however, suicidal ideation 
correlated more highly with hopelessness than with depression.  Further analyses showed 
evidence that suggested that hopelessness mediates the relationship between depression 
and suicidal ideation.      
 Kazdin, French, Unis, Esveldt-Dawson, and Sherick (1983) found that 
hospitalized subjects aged 5 to 13 years with high scores on hopelessness had higher 
levels of depression and lower self-esteem than those of low-scoring subjects.  
Additionally, hopelessness correlated more strongly with suicidal behavior than did 
depression.  Greater hopelessness was significantly positively correlated with intent in 
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subjects.  These data suggest that, like adults, childrens’ suicidal behavior is associated 
with negative beliefs about the self and the future.  
Measures of Hopelessness 
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) 
 The BHS (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974) is a 20-item, short question 
scale that was developed to assess hopelessness, a central component in depression and 
suicide.  True-false statements indicate responses.  Of the 20 items, 9 are coded false and 
11 true.  Responses are scored as 0 or 1, and there is a possible range of hopelessness 
from 0 to 20, with higher scores indicating higher degrees of hopelessness. 
 Reliability was assessed with a hospitalized psychiatric population (n = 294) and 
the internal consistency of individual items was good (r = .93; Beck et al., 1974).  
Durham (1982) found reliability to differ among two clinical samples and one college 
student sample (r = .86, .83, and .65, respectively), suggesting acceptable reliability with 
clinical populations.  Other studies conducted with college samples have shown better 
reliability (r = .85; Chang, D’Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 1994).  Dyce (1996) and 
Young, Halper, Clark, Scheftner and Fawcett (1992) found the internal consistency to be 
.92, which provided further support for the use of the BHS with clinical populations.  
Currently, no studies exist of test-retest reliability with the BHS (Steed, 2001).        
Concurrent validity was assessed by comparing the BHS with clinician ratings of 
hopelessness gleaned during patient interviews with other instruments designed to 
measure negative attitudes about the future.  Two samples were compared, one of general 
medical outpatients (n = 23) and the other of a psychiatric sample of individuals who had 
made a recent suicide attempt (n = 62).  The medical outpatient sample had a concurrent 
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validity of .74 (p < .001) and the psychiatric sample of .62 (p < .001).  The BHS has been 
correlated with the pessimism item on the BDI and the Stuart Future Test.  Correlation 
with the SFT was .60 (p < .001) and with the BDI was .63 (p < .001; Beck et al., 1974).  
Alford, Lester, Patel, Buchanan and Giunta (1995) showed the BHS significantly 
correlated with the BDI to predict later clinical depression symptoms in college and 
clinical populations.  Similar correlations with depression and hopelessness were found in 
the literature as well (Rholes, Riskind, & Neville, 1985).  The BHS has also correlated 
significantly with psychological stress measures, hopelessness items on the MMPI-2, the 
Optimism and Pessimism Scale, and the pessimism subscales of the Life Orientation Test 
(Steed, 2001).       
Regarding the factor structure of the BHS, the original principal components 
analysis revealed three factors, which were feelings about the future (41.7% of variance), 
loss of motivation (6.2% of variance), and expectations about the future (5.6% of 
variance; Beck et al., 1974).  This analysis was replicated by Dyce (1996), who also 
isolated three factors on the BHS in a sample of 411 outpatients with depression.  Note 
that discrepancies in the BHS factor structure have been found (e.g., Marshall, Wortman, 
Kusulas, Hervig, & Vickers, 1992; Ward & Thomas, 1985); however, these studies 
utilized differing analyses and response formats, which raise questions regarding 
generalizability of results.  Furthermore, some studies utilize college samples (e.g., 
Chang et al., 1994; Durham, 1982), which limit inferences that can be made about the 
data (Steed, 2001).  Though the BHS has been utilized in a number of populations, data 
suggest it may be most useful with clinical populations, for whom its use was originally 
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intended (Durham, 1982).  This utilization is possibly the result of the scale’s inability to 
detect lower levels of hopelessness in nonclinical populations (Young et al., 1992).      
Hopelessness Scale for Children (HSC) 
 The Hopelessness Scale for Children  (HSC; Kazdin et al., 1983) is a 17-item, 
self-report inventory used to measure hopelessness in children.  True-false statements 
indicate responses.  The scale is modeled after the BHS (Beck et al., 1974), and questions 
were reworded to be more accessible to children.  Items 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, and 16 are 
reverse scored, and higher scores indicate higher levels of hopelessness.   
 Psychometric analysis was conducted on 66 psychiatrically hospitalized children 
aged 8 to 13 years.  The HSC had an internal consistency of .75 (p < .001) and was 
positively correlated with severity of depression on the Children’s Depression Inventory 
(CDI), the Bellevue Index of Depression (BID), the Depression Symptom Checklist (DS-
CL), and the Self-Esteem Inventory (SEI; Kazdin et al., 1983).   
Internal consistency was adequate with an alpha of .97 in a study of 262 
psychiatrically hospitalized children aged 6 to 13 years.  A factor analysis revealed two 
factors, future expectations/giving up and happiness/future expectations, that accounted 
for 78 and 22% of the variance, respectively.  Test-retest reliability was .52 (p < .001), 
suggesting mediocre stability over time (Kazdin, Rodgers, & Colbus, 1986).   
Thurber, Hollingsworth, and Miller (1996) examined the psychometric properties 
of the HSC with 201 adolescent inpatients.  Authors administered the HSC to adolescents 
with a variety of Axis I disorders as part of a comprehensive psychological evaluation.  
Results of the analysis showed the HSC to have moderate item correlations.  A factor 
analysis identified two factors, motivational aspects and future happiness, which 
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accounted for 29 and 8.9% of the variance, respectively.  Though the factor structure is 
weaker in this study than in previously mentioned studies, the identified constructs are 
similar in all.  Internal consistency was lower than in previous studies, with an alpha of 
.81.  The results suggest that the HSC may not be as psychometrically sound with the 
adolescent population as with children.           
Geriatric Hopelessness Scale (GHS) 
 The GHS (Fry, 1984) was developed to measure hopelessness among older adults.  
The GHS is a 30-item, self-report measure for use with older individuals.  Although the 
scoring direction varies, all responses are converted to yield an overall score within a 
range of 0 to 30, with higher scores indicating higher levels of hopelessness.   
 A factor analysis of the scale items revealed a four-factor structure.  Factors 1, 2, 
3 and 4 accounted for 22, 21, 13 and 11% of the variance, respectively.  Factor loadings 
ranged from .66-.75 (Fry, 1984).  This study is in contrast to Hayslip, Lopez, and Nation 
(1991), who found two of the GHS items to have no variance.  Their factor analysis 
revealed 11 factors that accounted for 73.8% of the total variance; however, the items 
were poorly intercorrelated.  Overall, the authors suggested the GHS factor structure was 
unstable.  The internal consistency of the GHS was shown to be moderate (alpha = .69; 
Fry, 1984; Hayslip et al., 1991). 
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Chapter Three:  Hypotheses 
Hypotheses 1 through 3 are based on Baron and Kenny’s (1986) suggested steps 
to identify mediator variables in social psychological research.  A mediator is a variable 
that explains the relationship between an independent and dependent (i.e., outcome) 
variable.  Testing mediation involves four steps: (a) showing that the independent 
variable is correlated with the dependent variable; (b) showing that the independent 
variable is correlated with the mediator variable; (c) showing that the mediator affects the 
dependent variable and (d) controlling the mediator variable to show that the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables disappears completely.  If Steps 1 
through 4 are met, authors suggest complete mediation, whereas meeting the first three 
steps suggests partial mediation (Kenny, 2012).  Statistically, Baron suggested multiple 
regression analyses to estimate the mediation effect.  Hypotheses H1 through H4 
correspond directly to Baron and Kenny’s (1986) recommended steps.  
H1: The total score on the YSQ-SF (Young & Brown, 1998) will significantly predict the 
total score on the BHS (Beck et al., 1974). 
 According to cognitive theory, early maladaptive schemas play a crucial role in 
the development and maintenance of psychological disorders.  According to Beck’s 
cognitive theory of depression, early maladaptive schemas drive negative thoughts about 
the self, world, and future, which he described as the cognitive triad.  Negative thoughts 
about the future are characterized as hopelessness.  Psychopathology results from 
maladaptive assignment of meaning to the self, world, and future (Alford & Beck, 1997).  
Owing to this theoretical relationship, it is hypothesized that early maladaptive schema 
and hopelessness will be positively correlated. 
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H2: Total scores on the YSQ-SF (Young & Brown, 1999) will significantly predict total 
scores on the ICD.  That is, there will be a positive correlation between total scores on the 
YSQ-SF and the ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2002). 
According to cognitive theory (Alford & Beck, 1997), early maladaptive schema 
interacts with cognition, resulting in patterned emotional, attentional, memory and 
behavioral activity, a process Beck refers to as “cognitive content specificity” (p. 16).  As 
a result, individuals become susceptible to specific types of cognitive distortions, which, 
in turn, predispose them to specific psychological disorders.  Consistent with cognitive 
theory, it is expected that subjects who endorse maladaptive schema will also endorse 
distorted thinking.  
H3: Total scores on the ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2001) will predict total scores on the 
BHS (Beck et al., 1974). 
 Cognitive theory (Alford & Beck, 1997) espouses that early maladaptive schema 
interacts with cognition, resulting in patterned emotional, attentional, memory and 
behavioral activity.  This interaction makes individuals susceptible to specific types of 
cognitive distortions, which, in turn, predispose them to specific psychological disorders.  
Hopelessness is a cognitive state, comprised of both negative thoughts about the future 
and the belief that one cannot alter future events.  For example, Beck (2002) 
characterized the negative view of the future as self-evident in depressed individuals by 
both (a) hopelessness, or negative expectations about the future, and (b) helplessness, or 
one’s belief that one lacks the capability to affect future outcomes, respectively (Henkel, 
et al., 2002; Stotland, 1969).  Abramson et al. (1989) also defined hopelessness as the 
“expectation that highly valued outcomes will not occur or that highly aversive outcomes 
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will occur (i.e., hopelessness) coupled with an expectation that no response in one’s 
repertoire will change the likelihood of occurrence of these outcomes” (p. 359).  
Therefore, it is believed that distorted thinking will be correlated with hopelessness.     
H4: The total score on the ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2001) will partially, but not 
completely, mediate the relationship between total scores on the YSQ-SF (Young & 
Brown, 1999) and the BHS (Beck et al., 1974). 
Both Alford and Beck (1997) and Abramson et al. (1989) theorized hopelessness 
from diathesis-stress perspectives.   This model assumes an interaction between both 
perceived negative environmental events or stressors and genetic variables, such as 
cognitive style or genetic predisposition.  Therefore, consistent with the diathesis-stress 
models, it is expected that cognitive distortions will be one of a number of variables that 
will mediate the relationship between early maladaptive schema and hopelessness.     
H5: The ICD scales of (a) Fortune-Telling, (b) Perfectionism, (c) Magnification, (d)  
Emotional Reasoning, and (e) Jumping to Conclusions will predict hopelessness. 
H6: The ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2001) will demonstrate convergent validity by its 
correlation with the YSQ-SF (Young & Brown, 1999) and BHS (Beck et al., 1974). 
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Chapter Four:  Methods 
Overview 
Design and Design Justification 
This investigation utilized survey research and no identifiers were used to reduce 
the risk of creating an identifiable link to subject protected medical information.  This 
study utilized a correlational research design and mediational model to assess the role of 
cognitive distortions, as assessed by the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD), as a 
mediator between early maladaptive schema and hopelessness.  Schema and hopelessness 
were measured by the Young Schema Questionnaire (YSQ-SF) and the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS), respectively.  A correlational design was chosen primarily 
because of its common utilization in the social sciences and efficacy in examining the 
direction, strength, and variability of relationships between variables.   
Participants 
Subjects were chosen from four private mental-health outpatient sites in 
Pennsylvania.  Completed data from 85 participants were used in this study.  To qualify 
for the study, subjects had to be able to read and speak English, been aged 18 – 65 years, 
and been receiving either mental-health and/or alcohol/substance treatment at the time of 
the study.  Individuals undergoing corresponding psychopharmacological treatment were 
included in this study.  Participants with tic disorders, delirium, dementia, amnesic 
disorders, schizophrenia, and psychosis were excluded from participating.  Interested 
prospective volunteers who were participating in other studies or clinical investigations 
were excluded from this study.  All subjects were made fully aware of the voluntary 
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nature of the study, of the possible risks and of their right to withdraw at any time for any 
reason.  All participant data remained anonymous. 
Licensed psychologists, licensed professional counselors and licensed clinical 
social workers chose participants according to study inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
Therapists explained the study, assessed interest, and distributed and collected the 
participant data packets.     
Measures 
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD) 
 The ICD (Yurica & DiTomasso, 2002) is a 69-item, self-report scale that 
measures the frequency of an individual’s systematic errors in logical thinking, or 
cognitive distortions.  Items consist of short sentences that reflect types of distorted 
thinking.  Individual responses are chosen from a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., Never, Rarely, 
Sometimes, Often, Always), and response values range from 1 = Never to 5 = Always.   
The range of possible scores on the ICD is from 69 to 345.  Higher scores indicate higher 
frequencies of distorted thinking, while lower scores indicate lower frequencies.   
Regarding the instrument’s reliability and validity, the ICD has shown 
satisfactory construct validity.  Factor analysis revealed 11 factors that closely resembled 
10 theory-derived cognitive distortion subscales (i.e., Externalization of Self-Worth, 
Fortune-Telling, Magnification, Labeling, Perfectionism, Comparison to Others, 
Emotional Reasoning, Arbitrary Inference/Jumping to Conclusion, Minimization, and 
Mind Reading) in addition to one nontheory-derived cognitive distortion subscale, which 
was labeled Emotional Reasoning/Decision Making (Yurica, 2002).  Content validity was 
determined by a panel of three cognitive therapy experts, all of whom agreed 
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unequivocally on the validity of the original 69 items.  Test-retest reliability indicated 
very strong consistency over time with total scores of .998 (n = 28, p < .0001).   
Concurrent validity is acceptable in that the  ICD is significantly correlated with 
measures of negative thinking, depression, and anxiety, which will be explained briefly 
later.  The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) was designed to measure a depressed 
person’s negative attitudes toward self, world and others.  Items on the ICD were shown 
to be positively and significantly correlated to negative attitudes (r = .70, n = 159, p < 
.0001).  The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) 
are measures of depression and anxiety symptoms, respectively.  The ICD was positively 
and significantly correlated with both of these instruments (r = .70, n = 161, p < .0001; r 
= .59, n = 161, p < .0001, respectively; Yurica, 2002). 
Yurica (2002) also found the ICD to have strong criterion validity.  Her sample 
consisted of clinical (n = 122) and non-clinical (n = 66) participants, and the ICD was 
able to significantly distinguish between the two groups (F = 15.2, df = 169, p < .0001).  
Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) 
 The BHS (Beck et al., 1974) is a 20-item, short question scale that was developed 
to assess hopelessness, a central component in depression and suicide (Beck et al., 1974).  
Responses are indicated by true-false statements.  Of the 20 items, 9 are coded false and 
11 true.  Responses are scored as 0 or 1, and there is a possible range of hopelessness 
from 0 to 20, with higher scores indicating higher degrees of hopelessness. 
 Reliability was assessed with a hospitalized psychiatric population (n = 294) and 
the internal consistency of individual items was high (r = .93; Beck, et al., 1974).  
Durham (1982) found reliability to differ among two clinical samples and one college 
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student sample (r = .86, .83 and .65, respectively), suggesting acceptable reliability with 
clinical populations.  Other studies conducted with college samples have shown better 
reliability (r = .85; Chang et al., 1994).  Dyce (1996) and Young et al. (1992) found the 
internal consistency to be .92, which provided further support for the use of the BHS with 
clinical populations.  Currently, no studies exist of test-retest reliability with the BHS 
(Steed, 2001).        
Concurrent validity was assessed by comparing the BHS with clinician ratings of 
hopelessness gleaned during patient interviews with other instruments designed to 
measure negative attitudes about the future.  Two samples were compared, one of general 
medical outpatients (n = 23) and the other a psychiatric sample of individuals who had 
made a recent suicide attempt (n = 62).  The medical outpatient sample had a concurrent 
validity of .74 (p < .001) and the psychiatric sample of .62 (p < .001).  The BHS has been 
correlated with the pessimism item on the BDI and the Stuart Future Test (SFT).  
Correlation with the SFT was .60 (p < .001) and with the BDI, .63 (p < .001) (Beck et al, 
1974).  Alford et al. (1995) showed the BHS significantly correlated with the BDI to 
predict later clinical depression symptoms in college and clinical populations.  Similar 
correlations with depression and hopelessness were found in the literature as well (Rholes 
et al., 1985).  The BHS has also correlated significantly with psychological stress 
measures, hopelessness items on the MMPI-2, the Optimism and Pessimism Scale, and 
the pessimism subscales of the Life Orientation Test (Steed, 2001).       
Regarding the factor structure of the BHS, the original principal components 
analysis revealed three factors, which were feelings about the future (41.7% of variance), 
loss of motivation (6.2% of variance) and expectations about the future (5.6% of 
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variance; Beck, et al., 1974).  This analysis was replicated by Dyce (1996), who also 
isolated three factors on the BHS in a sample of 411 outpatients with depression.  Noted 
that discrepancies in the BHS factor structure have been found (e.g., Marshall et al., 
1992; Ward & Thomas, 1985); however, these studies utilized differing analyses and 
response formats which raise questions regarding generalizability of results.  
Furthermore, some studies utilize college samples (e.g., Chang et al., 1994; Durham, 
1982), which limit inferences that can be made about the data (Steed, 2001).  Though the 
BHS has been utilized in a number of populations, data suggest it may be most useful 
with clinical populations, for whom its use was originally intended (Durham, 1982).  This 
utilization is possibly the result of to the scale’s inability to detect lower levels of 
hopelessness in nonclinical populations (Young et al., 1992).      
Young Schema Questionnaire—Short Form (YSQ-SF) 
 The YSQ-SF (Young & Brown, 1998) is a 75-question, self-administered 
inventory designed to measure 15 early maladaptive schemas taken directly from the 205- 
question Young Schema Questionnaire—Long Form (YSQ-LF).  The schemas are 
emotional deprivation, abandonment, mistrust/abuse, social isolation, defectiveness, 
incompetence, dependency, vulnerability to harm, enmeshment, subjugation of needs, 
self-sacrifice, emotional inhibition, unrelenting standards, entitlement, and insufficient 
self-control.  Items are scored on a 6-point scale from (1) completely untrue of me to (6) 
describes me perfectly.  Possible scores range from 75 to 450, with higher scores 
indicating a higher presence of maladaptive schema.  
 A factor analysis of the YSQ-SF (Welburn et al., 2002) determined construct 
validity to be adequate for use in a clinical population.  The YSQ-SF was administered to 
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202 predominantly female subjects (n = 131).  Results identified 15 factors that 
accounted for 73.1% of the variance.  Of the 75 items, 35, 36, 46, and  cross-loaded, and 
item 38 did not load on any of the 15 factors.  Overall, results suggested that the factor 
structure of the YSQ-SF is strong.   
 Waller et al. (2001) studied the YSQ-SF internal consistency with 60 female 
subjects with bulimia and 60 healthy subjects and found it to be moderate to high.  The 
clinical group had an alpha of .96 while the nonclinical group was .92.  Authors found no 
discernable difference between the YSQ-LF and YSQ-SF.  Similar results were repeated 
with South Korean and Australian subjects, with alpha levels of .94 and .96, respectively 
(Baranoff et al., 2006).  Overall, this data suggest the scale has very good internal 
consistency.  Welburn et al. (2002) conducted an analysis of the YSQ-SF via Cronbach’s 
alpha and found coefficients of the 15 scales that ranged from .76 to .93, suggesting 
adequate to good internal consistency. 
 The YSQ-SF has been shown to discriminate among some psychological 
disorders.  Waller et al. (2001) found that the purging behavior of subjects with and 
without bulimia could be significantly distinguished using the YSQ-SF.  Authors 
determined the YSQ-SF to have adequate discriminate validity.  Discriminate validity of 
the YSQ-SF was similar to that of the YSQ-LF, with the short form having significant, 
albeit a more conservative, discriminant function. 
Welburn et al. (2002) examined the YSQ-SF’s ability to predict depression, 
anxiety, and paranoia in a clinical population.  Authors conducted a series of multiple 
regressions to determine the relationship of the YSQ-SF subscales to clinical 
symptomology.  They used three scales from the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI), a 
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measure of psychiatric symptomology.  The YSQ-SF subscales predicted 52% of the 
variance in anxiety (R = .72, p < .0001), 47% of the variance in depression (R = .47, p < 
.0001) and 62% of the variance in paranoia (R = .62, p < .0001).  Results suggest the 
YSQ-SF has good predictive validity. 
Glaser et al. (2002) also examined the predictive validity for psychological 
distress of the YSQ-SF using 188 predominantly female (n =132) outpatients.  Subjects 
completed the YSQ-SF, the Symptoms Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R), the BDI, the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), and the Millon Clinical Multiaxial 
Inventory-II (MCMI-II).  The YSQ-SF correlated well with the aforementioned 
instruments with YSQ-SF scores accounting for 54% of the variance of BDI scores (F = 
9.26, p < .001) and 50% of the total variance in anxiety subscales of the SCL-90-R and 
the MCMI-II (F = 8.30, p < .001).  Like Welburn et al. (2002), these authors suggested 
the YSQ-SF has good predictive validity, especially for depression symptoms.                 
Research suggests that the factor structure of the YSQ-SF is sound.  Internal 
consistency of the measure has been shown to be adequate to very good, and the 
instrument has shown the ability to discriminate between individuals with and without 
bulimia.  Lastly, the YSQ-SF has the ability to predict psychological distress, including 
depression and anxiety.  Overall, the scale has adequate reliability and validity and is 
effective for use with clinical populations (Oei & Baranoff, 2007). 
Procedures 
 Four private mental-health outpatient sites in Pennsylvania were chosen for this 
study.  Data were collected from three separate programs within each facility.  Rehab 
After Work is a licensed intensive outpatient drug and alcohol treatment program.  The 
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Light Program is a mental-health intensive outpatient program.  Life Counseling Services 
provides traditional outpatient mental-health counseling.  Licensed psychologists, 
counselors, and social workers from the aforementioned companies were approached to 
assess interest in volunteering to distribute the study materials to their clients.  Data 
gatherers were clear that their participation was purely voluntary and, they could not 
ethically be remunerated.  
Eight therapists were individually trained on how to approach subjects, provide a 
brief rationale for the study, and assure their clients of anonymity of responses.  Data 
gatherers were briefed on the study and given a copy of the study solicitation letter to use 
as a guide when discussing the study with their clients (see Appendix).  They informed 
their clients that they were helping a colleague collect research data on a study examining 
the way that early childhood experiences affect people’s thinking and relate to feelings of 
hopelessness.  In order to strengthen internal validity, data collectors were not briefed on 
the hypotheses of the study.   
 Subjects who chose to participate were given a packet containing a study 
solicitation letter, three questionnaires, and a brief demographic sheet.  Subjects 
completed the packet in the waiting room of their respective locations and returned it 
their therapists.  All materials were stored in a locked file cabinet and collected by the 
study’s author at the end of each week.  Weekly communication with volunteer staff was 
kept via email in the event that any questions or concerns arose.     
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Chapter Five:  Results 
A correlational research design was utilized to show the relationship of cognitive 
distortions to early maladaptive schema and hopelessness.  It was hypothesized that 
distorted thinking would partially mediate the relationship between early maladaptive 
schema and hopelessness (hypotheses 1 - 4).  The four-step mediation model proposed by 
Baron and Kenney (1986) was used to determine this relationship.  The approach 
involved conducting a simple regression with early maladaptive schema as the 
independent variable and hopelessness as the dependent variable.  A second simple 
regression was conducted with the Inventory of Cognitive Distortions, (ICD; Yurica & 
DiTomasso, 2001) as the predictor and hopelessness as the dependent variable.  Finally, a 
multiple regression analysis was conducted with the ICD (controlling for the mediator) 
and early maladaptive schema predicting hopelessness.  Rather than follow step 4 to 
show mediation, the Sobel Test was utilized.  This was used primarily because it is 
considered both a more statistically rigorous and common test of mediation (Kenny, 
2012).  It is currently the highest recommended test for mediation.    
Additionally, it was hypothesized that the ICD scales of (a) Fortune-Telling, (b) 
Perfectionism, (c) Magnification, (d) Emotional Reasoning, and (e) Jumping to 
Conclusions would predict hopelessness (hypothesis 5).  Lastly, it was believed that the 
ICD would demonstrate convergent validity by its correlation with the Young Schema 
Questionnaire—Short Form (YSQ-SF; Young & Brown, 1999) and the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (Beck et al., 1974; hypothesis 6). 
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Demographic Characteristics  
 The sample was predominantly male (57%) and Caucasian (75.6%).  Being in 
treatment was required for participation in the study.  Participants were either receiving 
treatment for mental health (47.7%), alcohol/substance (33.7%) or both (16.3%).  The 
majority was taking psychotropic medications for a diagnosed psychiatric disorder 
(77.9%).  Additionally, a small majority of subjects (52.3%) had been hospitalized at 
least once for mental-health reasons.  Education levels varied, though the majority had 
some college education (32.6%).  Table 1 includes demographic characteristics of the 
sample.    
Hypothesis 1 
It was hypothesized that the total scores on the YSQ-SF would predict the total 
scores on the BHS.  The results demonstrated a moderately significant positive Pearson 
correlation coefficient (r = .639, r² = .409, p < .001, one-tailed).  This correlation 
illustrates a coefficient of determination where approximately 41% of the variation in a 
subject’s level of hopelessness could be attributed to differences in the total score on the 
YSQ-SF.  A simple regression using the YSQ-SF as the predictor and the BHS as the 
criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation was a significant  (F(1, 83) = 
57.41, p = .001) predictor of the criterion.  As shown in Table 2, the YSQ-SF total score 
was a significant predictor of hopelessness. 
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Table 1 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Demographic                   Frequency          Percent 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Gender 
Male       49   57.6 
Female       36   42.4 
Ethnicity 
Caucasian        65   75.6 
Asian         2     2.3 
African American        9   10.5    
Hispanic/Latino        5     5.8  
Biracial         4     4.7  
Education level  
Grade school or less       0     0.0 
Some high school        4     4.7 
High school graduate      20   20.3 
Technical/trade        5     5.8 
Some college        28   32.6 
College graduate       19   22.1 
Post graduate        9   10.5 
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Table 1-cont. 
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
 ___________________________________________________________________ 
Demographic          Frequency           Percent 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Inpatient hospitalization for mental health  
Hospitalized    45   52.3 
Never hospitalized   40   46.5 
Medication 
Not taking medication                         18   20.9 
Taking medication   67   77.9 
Current treatment 
Mental health     41   47.7 
Alcohol/substance     29   33.7  
Both      14   16.3    
__________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 
Simple Regression Analysis of Early Maladaptive Schema and Hopelessness 
Model  
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
t 
 
p 
B Std. Error Beta 
1    (Constant)  
       YSQ-SF total score 
-5.524 
.050 
1.728 
.007 
 
.639 
-3.197 
7.577 
.002 
.001 
Note: Dependent variable:  Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS), Independent variable: 
Young Schema Questionnaire-Short Form (YSQ-SF) 
 
Hypothesis 2 
It was hypothesized that total scores on the YSQ-SF would predict total scores on 
the ICD.  As suspected, results showed a strong positive Pearson correlation coefficient (r 
= .843, r² =  .711, p < .001, one-tailed).  This finding demonstrates that subjects’ levels of 
early maladaptive schema explained roughly 70% of the fluctuation in subjects’ cognitive 
distortions scores.  A simple regression using the YSQ-SF as the predictor and the ICD as 
the criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation was significant  (F(1, 83) = 
204.41, p = .001).  As shown in Table 3, the presence of early maladaptive schema was a 
significant predictor of distorted thinking. 
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Table 3 
Simple Regression Analysis of the Early Maladaptive Schema and Cognitive Distortions 
Model  
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
t 
 
p 
B Std. Error Beta 
1    (Constant)  
       YSQ-SF total score 
54.654 
     .555 
10.248 
.039 
 
          .843 
5.333 
14.297 
.001 
.001 
Note: Dependent Variable:  Inventory of Cognitive Distortions, YSQ-SF = Young 
Schema Questionnaire-Short Form 
 
Hypothesis 3 
It was hypothesized that the ICD would predict hopelessness.  The results 
revealed a moderate Pearson correlation between these variables (r = .595, r² =  .354, p < 
.001, one-tailed).  The coefficient of determination revealed that 35% of the variability in 
hopelessness was attributable to differences in ICD scores.  A simple regression using the 
ICD total score as the predictor and the BHS total score as the criterion demonstrated that 
the overall regression equation was significant  (F(1, 83) = 45.5, p = .001).  As shown in 
Table 4, the ICD total score was a significant predictor of hopelessness. 
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Table 4 
Simple Regression Analysis of Cognitive Distortions and Hopelessness 
Model  
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
T 
 
p 
B Std. Error Beta 
1    (Constant)  
       ICD total score 
-6.658 
.070 
2.093 
.010 
 
                .595 
-3.181 
6.745 
.002 
.001 
Note: Dependent Variable:  Beck Hopelessness Scale, ICD = Inventory of Cognitive 
Distortions 
 
Hypothesis 4   
It was hypothesized that the total score on the ICD would partially, but not 
completely, mediate the relationship between total scores on the YSQ-SF (Young & 
Brown, 1990) and the BHS (Beck et al., 1974).  As mentioned above, Kenny (2012) 
recommends using the Sobel Test to determine the mediating effect of distorted thinking.   
To test the ICD as a mediator of the relationship between the YSQ and the BHS 
four steps were followed.  First, a correlation matrix among all three variables was 
conducted which demonstrated multicollinearity between the ICD and the YSQ.  Second, 
a simple linear regression with YSQ as the predictor and the ICD as the dependent 
variable was conducted in order to obtain beta and standard error values to assess 
mediation through the use of the Sobel test.  The next regression analysis entailed the 
BHS as the dependent variable and retaining the YSQ as a control and adding the ICD to 
the equation.  The beta weight and standard error of the ICD was used as variable b in the 
Sobel equation.  Lastly, the betas and standard errors from the previous two regression 
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analyses were entered in to the Sobel Test formula.  The regression coefficient for the 
relationship between the independent variable and the mediator was .56.  The regression 
coefficient for the relationship between the mediator and the dependent variable was .02.  
The standard error of the relationship between the independent variable and the mediator 
was .04.  The standard error of the relationship between the mediator variable and the 
dependent variable is .02.  The Sobel Test statistic equaled 0.99745870 (p=0.15927096) 
supporting the absence of mediation. 
Hypothesis 5 
 It was hypothesized that the ICD subscales of (a) Fortune-Telling, (b) 
Perfectionism, (c) Magnification, (d) Emotional Reasoning, and (e) Jumping to 
Conclusions would predict hopelessness.  The hypothesis was not supported, although the 
linear combination of the ICD subscales of magnification, fortune-telling and jumping to 
conclusions was found to predict hopelessness in study subjects.   
A moderately significant Pearson Correlation of the ICD subscale Magnification 
and the BHS was found (r = .554, r² =  .306, p < .001, one-tailed).  The coefficient of 
determination revealed that approximately 31% of differences in hopelessness scores 
could be attributed to differences in subjects’ scores on the ICD Magnification subscale.  
A simple regression using the BHS total score as the dependent variable and the ICD 
magnification subscale total score as the independent variable established that the overall 
regression equation was significant (F(1, 84) = 36.7, p = .001).  
A moderately significant positive Pearson correlation between Fortune-Telling 
and the BHS (r = .531, r² =  .282, p < .001, one-tailed) was found.  The coefficient of 
determination revealed that 28% of the variability in hopelessness was attributable to 
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differences in subjects’ scores on the ICD subscale of Fortune-Telling.  A simple 
regression using the ICD Fortune-Telling subscale total score as the predictor and the 
BHS as the criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation was significant  
(F(1, 84) = 32.61, p = .001).   
The Pearson correlation between the ICD subscale Jumping to Conclusions and 
hopelessness was not significant (r = .158, r² =  .025, p < .074).  Independently, the 
cognitive distortion of Jumping to Conclusions was not shown to predict hopelessness.  A 
simple regression using the ICD subscale jumping to conclusions as the predictor and the 
BHS total score as the criterion confirmed that the overall regression equation was not 
significant (F(1, 84) = 2.126, p = .149).  As shown in Table 5, the ICD subscale Jumping 
to Conclusions was not a significant predictor of hopelessness when examined 
independently.   
 
Table 5 
Pearson Correlations of the Beck Hopelessness Scale and Independent Subscales of the 
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Subscale    r  r²  p 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Fortune-Telling   .531  .282  .001 
Magnification    .554  .306  .001 
Perfectionism    .291  .085  .003 
Emotional Reasoning   .266  .070  .007 
Jumping to Conclusions  .158  .025  .149 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Dependent variable:  Beck Hopelessness Scale, Independent variable: Inventory of 
Cognitive Distortions (ICD) 
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Alternatively, when Jumping to Conclusions was combined with the subscales of 
Magnification and Fortune-Telling, the combination was shown to significantly predict 
hopelessness.  Together, these distortions accounted for 40% of the variability in 
hopelessness scores.  Table 6 demonstrates Jumping to Conclusion scale’s contribution 
when combined with the subscales of Magnification and Fortune-Telling.  
 
Table 6  
Pearson Correlations of the Beck Hopelessness Scale and Combined Subscales of 
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions 
 
Model  
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
t 
 
p 
B Std. Error Beta 
1    (Constant)  
  Fortune-Telling 
  Magnification 
  Perfectionism 
  Emotional Reasoning 
  Jumping to Conclusions 
-3.695 
.188 
.388 
.068 
.184 
-.745 
2.398 
.087 
.127 
.141 
.213 
.268 
 
 
 .321 
.427 
.050 
.093 
-.312 
-1.541 
2.160 
3.058 
.481 
.864 
-2.780 
.127 
.034 
.003 
.632 
.390 
.007 
Note: Dependent variable:  Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS), Independent variable:  
Inventory of Cognitive Distortions (ICD) 
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Hypothesis 6 
It was hypothesized that the ICD would show convergent validity with the YSQ-
SF and the BHS.  As predicted, the ICD was shown to measure theoretically similar 
constructs to the YSQ-SF and the BHS.     
Results of Pearson correlations suggested a strong moderate correlation between 
the ICD and YSQ-SF (r = .648, r² = .420, p < .001, one-tailed).  More than 40% of the 
variance in the total score of the ICD could be attributed to changes in the total score on 
the YSQ-SF.  A simple regression using the YSQ-SF as the predictor and the ICD as the 
criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation was significant  (F(1, 83) = 
204.41, p = .001), indicating that, as expected, the ICD and YSQ-SF measure similar 
constructs. 
Similarly, a Pearson correlation between the ICD and BHS suggested a moderate 
positive correlation (r = .595, r² = .354, p < .001, one-tailed).  The coefficient of 
determination revealed that 35% of the variability in hopelessness was attributable to 
differences in ICD scores.  A simple regression using the ICD total score as the predictor 
and the BHS total score as the criterion demonstrated that the overall regression equation 
was significant  (F(1, 83) = 45.5, p = .001).  This significance suggests that the ICD and 
BHS have adequate convergent validity. 
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Chapter Six:  Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the mediational relationship of 
cognitive distortions to maladaptive schema and hopelessness.  First, it was believed that 
distorted thinking would be one, but not the only, factor to predict hopelessness.  Second, 
it was believed that there would be a cluster of cognitive distortions related to 
hopelessness.  This chapter will summarize and expand on the findings of this study, as 
well as discuss the implications of the results in light of the existing literature.  In 
addition, study limitations and suggestions for future research will be explored. 
The results from this study found early maladaptive schema and hopelessness to 
be associated.  This finding is not surprising because early maladaptive schema and 
hopelessness are both measured by their cognitive content.  This relationship gives 
support to the cognitive diathesis-stress model of depression in Alford and Beck’s (1997) 
cognitive theory.  It espouses that an individual’s cognitive diathesis (i.e., schematic 
themes of loss and helplessness) along with personality factors, such as sociotropy, 
interact with stressful life events to create a vulnerability to symptoms of depression.  
The bias in information processing created by schemas is thought to give way to 
cognitive distortions.  When distorted thinking includes the cognitive triad, or negative 
beliefs about self, world, and future, depression symptomatology is considered likely.  
Negative beliefs about the future characterize hopelessness.   
This study also found early maladaptive schema to be associated with distorted 
thinking and early maladaptive schema and distorted thinking to be highly correlated.  
This finding is consistent with Alford and Beck’s (1997) assertion that cognitive schemas 
act to bias information processing in a way that produces cognitive distortions. This 
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finding is also consistent with Beck and Clark’s (1988) notion of the cognitive triad in 
depression.  According to cognitive theory (Alford & Beck, 1997), early maladaptive 
schema interacts with cognition, resulting in patterned emotional, attentional, memory, 
and behavioral activity, a process Beck refers to as “cognitive content specificity” (p. 16).  
As a result, individuals become susceptible to specific types of cognitive distortions, 
which, in turn, predispose them to specific psychological disorders.   
These findings are also consistent with Kendall’s (1992) theory of cognitive 
distortions, which espouses that how information is filtered and organized into schematic 
structures drives other aspects of cognition, such as distorted thinking.  These distorted 
thoughts are implicated in triggering a variety of emotions and behavior. 
Consistent with cognitive theory, our finding suggests that individuals who endorse 
early maladaptive schema are more likely to develop distorted thoughts.  This finding is 
important to clinical practice because distorted thinking has been implicated in a number 
of psychological disorders.  This finding highlights the importance of gathering a strong 
clinical history of early maladaptive events that may be cognitively misinterpreted.  
Thematic beliefs about oneself, the world, and the future are believed to generate 
accessible distorted thoughts within a given schematic theme that can be challenged and 
modified through cognitive behavioral therapy.  This idea is supported by Beck (1964), 
Beck, Freeman, et al. (1990), and Padesky (1994), who suggested that schemas could be 
identified via their cognitive content.  All have encouraged the identification of cognitive 
distortions to root out underlying core beliefs related to patient cognitive schemas.   
Distorted thinking was found to be significantly related to hopelessness.  This 
finding suggests that those who frame the future in a distorted way are more likely to 
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experience hopelessness.  This idea is supported by Beck and Clark (1988) and 
Abramson et al. (1989) notions of hopelessness as a group of cognitions about the future.  
Beck (2002) characterized the negative view of the future that is evident in depressed 
individuals by both (a) hopelessness, or negative expectations about the future, and (b) 
helplessness, or one’s belief that one lacks the capability to affect future outcomes 
(Henkel, et al., 2002; Stotland, 1969).  Similarly, Abramson et al. (1989) defined 
hopelessness as the “expectation that highly valued outcomes will not occur or that 
highly aversive outcomes will occur (i.e., hopelessness) coupled with an expectation that 
no response in one’s repertoire will change the likelihood of occurrence of these 
outcomes” (p. 359). 
Despite significant correlations amongst individual variables, distorted thinking 
was not found to partially mediate the relationship between early maladaptive schema 
and hopelessness.  That is, distorted thinking does not appear to be the predominant 
mechanism explaining the relationship between early maladaptive schema and 
hopelessness.  This finding is inconsistent with Beck’s (1963) emphasis on the mediating 
effect of distorted thinking in psychological dysfunction (Beck, 1963).  It is also 
inconsistent with Abramson et al.’s (1989) theory of hopelessness depression. 
This finding is consistent with Haaga et al.’s (1991) review of the cognitive model 
of depression.  Authors did not find sufficient evidence that the theory differentiated 
between information processing bias and distorted thinking.   When explained, the 
information processing bias refers to an underlying process shift or orientation that 
negatively distorts one’s thoughts.  This relationship has close similarities to that of early 
maladaptive schema and cognitive distortions.  In addition, both early maladaptive 
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schema and cognitive distortions represent similar cognitive processes.  The abstract, 
inaccessible nature of early maladaptive schemas limits their ability to be accurately 
measured.  Methodological problems can also arise when variables are too similar.  The 
very high correlation between the YSQ-SF and ICD was likely a consequence of 
multicollinearity due to the use of a proximal mediator.  In other words, the high 
correlation could have resulted from both questionnaires measuring the same construct 
(i.e., distorted thinking).  
The significant finding that the linear combination of the ICD subscales of 
Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions was associated with 
hopelessness suggests that other specific clusters of cognitive distortions may be 
associated with hopelessness.  Our study, hypothesized that only five would be related to 
hopelessness, which is far from exhaustive.  Furthermore, the findings suggest that other 
groupings of distorted thinking may be implicated in other disorders. 
The relationship of distorted thinking to hopelessness is important to clinical 
practice in that the definition implies that distorted thinking encompasses hopelessness in 
individuals with depression.  So, identification and treatment of distorted thinking as it 
relates to hopelessness should be a critical intervention with patients with hopelessness.  
In particular, this study found a linear combination consisting of the cognitive distortions 
of Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions as significantly correlated 
with hopelessness.  This linear combination gives psychologists insight into the way that 
a person’s thoughts distort to contribute to hopelessness.  
This study’s findings show that the cognitive distortions of Magnification, 
Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions are highly correlated with hopelessness.  
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Because hopelessness is so strongly correlated with suicide, measuring for the presence 
of this distortion grouping gives practitioners a new risk factor to help gauge suicide risk 
in patients.  Along with risk factors for suicide, such as suicide attempt history, loss, and 
substance use, practitioners have a previously unidentified risk factor to increase their 
predictability of suicidal behavior in clinical populations.   
This finding gives insight into the thinking patterns of individuals experiencing 
hopelessness.  These individuals (a) believe they can predict future events, (b) will move 
beyond provided evidence to reach conclusions that are invariably negative, and (c) will 
view conclusions reached as catastrophic and unbearable.   
This finding has practical applications in the field of mental health.  In inpatient 
settings, treatment teams often have the responsibility of determining patients’ 
appropriateness for discharge.  Treatment providers’ goals may differ from those of 
patients.  Clients may want to be discharged before it is clinically indicated.  Inpatient 
hospitalization can be a shameful and embarrassing experience, and patients may not 
communicate current suicidal ideation for fear they will remain hospitalized.  Being able 
to accurately assess a patient’s readiness for discharge therefore becomes imperative to 
the inpatient treatment team.  The research findings here can be part of a comprehensive 
treatment approach that involves identifying distorted thinking associated with 
hopelessness and suicide, treating those distortions, and measuring progress.   
Utilizing a measure like the ICD could be a critical component in identifying the 
distortions of Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions.  Even without 
a statistical tool like the ICD, the practitioner and patient could engage in a conversation 
about his/her future during which time the psychologist will listen for language 
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representative of the distortions of Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to 
Conclusions.    
Identifying the distortions associated with hopelessness at admission gives staff 
psychologists a treatment intervention point.  Often patients refer to hopelessness as a 
feeling, rather than as a group of thoughts.  Treating hopelessness as a group of cognitive 
distortions allows practitioners and patients to open these cognitions up to cognitive 
behavioral examination and testing.  Patients have the opportunity to test and choose their 
view of future events and their own self-efficacy to affect those events.  For instance, the 
thought that only negative events will occur in the future encompasses cognitive errors 
(i.e., Fortune-Telling, Jumping to Conclusions) that patients can be taught to identify and 
challenge.  
Posttreatment assessment could be a critical part of the treatment team’s decision-
making process.  Using the ICD at this stage of treatment can give the treatment team a 
measureable marker to assess hopelessness in patients.  In addition, patient self-report 
regarding hopelessness and suicidal thinking during treatment team meetings can be 
compared with both ICD data on relevant subscales and ICD endorsements at admission.   
This finding has practical applications for outpatient treatment as well.  Outpatient 
evaluations for treatment services should include an assessment of suicide risk.  The 
linear combination of distortions identified in this study is an additional risk factor for 
suicide that helps to strengthen the predictive accuracy of a suicide assessment.  Being 
able to more accurately assess suicide risk can inform level of care and treatment 
planning.   
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In some cases, patients may be reluctant to admit to hopelessness and suicidal 
ideation, especially when the legal system or family members influence a person’s 
decision to enter treatment.  Shame about having a mental illness and suicidal thoughts 
may inhibit patients from disclosing thoughts they have.  With measurements of the 
linear combination of Magnification, Fortune-Telling, and Jumping to Conclusions, 
practitioners have more objective insight into a person’s thinking.  This cognitive risk 
factor for hopelessness, along with emotional and behavioral risk factors for suicide, 
gives practitioners a clearer sense of a patient’s needs.   
Hopelessness can be treated in regular therapy sessions once identified.  Patients 
can be educated about how the combination of Magnification, Jumping to Conclusions, 
and Fortune-Telling predicts hopelessness.  Treatment with cognitive behavioral therapy 
teaches patients to identify these distortions in their thinking, challenge them, and replace 
them with more realistic alternatives.   
Cognitive behavioral treatment of hopelessness can have effects in drug and 
alcohol settings as well.  Helping patients to decrease hopelessness has implications for 
their belief in their ability to reach their goals of sobriety.  Alerting patients to the linear 
combination of the Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions as they 
relate to hopelessness and teaching them to treat these thoughts with cognitive behavioral 
therapy gives patients with drug and alcohol problems a skill to maintain sobriety through 
treatment and beyond. 
 In summary, though this study did not provide find distorted thinking to mediate 
early maladaptive schema and hopelessness, it did lend further support to the cognitive 
model.  First, significant relationships between early maladaptive schema, distorted 
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thinking and hopelessness were found.  There is evidence that individuals who endorse 
early maladaptive schema also endorse distorted thinking.  Distorted thinking was 
significantly related to hopelessness and a significant relationship between early 
maladaptive schema and hopelessness was found.   
In addition to these findings, the cognitive distortions of Magnification, Fortune-
Telling and Jumping to Conclusions were, when combined, significant contributors to 
hopelessness.  Considering the strong association of hopelessness with suicide, this 
finding has important treatment implications for the assessment and treatment of 
individuals with hopelessness as well as practical practice applications.  It gives 
psychologists a new measurable risk factor in the assessment of suicide that can be used 
in both inpatient and outpatient settings.    
This study provided further support for the ICD in terms of convergent validity 
with the YSQ-SF and BHS.  The literature on the ICD suggests it is a strong 
psychometric instrument for the measurement of distorted thinking in research settings.             
The findings suggest that the ICD, YSQ-SF, and BHS could be critical tools in treatment 
settings for patient assessment and treatment.  
Study Limitations 
 One significant limitation to this study is the abstract nature of early maladaptive 
schemas.  The literature shows a significant variation in their definitions.  The strong 
correlation between the YSQ-SF and ICD in this study may be explained by the similarity 
of the constructs being measured.  The high correlation could result from both 
questionnaires measuring distorted thinking.    
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 Though the ICD has been shown to be a strong instrument in research settings, 
psychometric properties still need to be evaluated.  Particularly, the instrument should be 
factor analyzed with a larger sample.   
 Finally, this study utilized self-report measures, which have potential limitations.  
Research suggests that self-report measures require subject interpretation, which can vary 
significantly and can be further impacted by affective state.  In addition, denial, poor 
insight, and self-preservation raise validity concerns with self-report measures (Kazdin, 
1998).   
Directions for Future Research 
 The significant finding that the linear combination of the ICD subscales of 
Magnification, Fortune-Telling and Jumping to Conclusions was associated with 
hopelessness suggests that other specific clusters of cognitive distortions may be 
associated with hopelessness.  Our study, hypothesized that only five would be related to 
hopelessness, which is far from exhaustive.  Furthermore, the findings suggest that other 
groupings of distorted thinking may be implicated in other disorders. 
 The ICD has shown to be a strong instrument in research settings, and further 
exploration of its psychometric properties is needed.  Critical to the investigation of the 
instrument would be factor analysis using a larger sample.   
 Rosenfield (2004), who also used the ICD in his research, highlighted the fact that 
the ICD only significantly accounted for variance among variables measured. With this 
said, cognitive theories of depression and hopelessness suggest that a complex 
relationship of variables (e.g., biological, genetic, social, environmental, or 
physiological), or combinations of variables, interact to contribute to psychological 
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dysfunction.  Further exploration of additional variables should be the subject of future 
explorations.   
Conclusions 
Despite its limitations, this study has revealed a number of significant findings.  
They include the relationship of cognitive distortions to both early maladaptive schema 
and hopelessness.  
Additionally, the combination of predicting future events negatively (i.e., 
Fortune-Telling, Jumping to Conclusions) along with overinflating the significance or 
severity of outcomes or one’s inability to influence those outcomes (i.e., Magnification) 
appears to significantly influence the development of hopelessness.  Identification of 
Fortune-Telling, Jumping to Conclusions, and Magnification with a measure like the ICD 
is a critical component in a comprehensive assessment of potential suicidality.  Because 
hopelessness is so highly correlated with suicide, this study’s findings suggest that this 
linear combination of cognitive distortions, along with other factors, is a significant risk 
factor for predicting suicidal behavior.  Early assessment of these cognitive distortions 
would provide focus for cognitive behavioral treatment of hopelessness and suicidal 
ideation.           
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Appendix  
Dear Volunteer: 
My name is Keith Milligan, I am a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Psychology 
at the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine (PCOM).  I am doing a research 
study examining the way that early childhood experiences affect the people’s thinking 
and possibly lead to hopelessness.  By participating, you may feel some personal 
satisfaction having taken part in research that may improve the quality of health care for 
clients who seek treatment for emotional difficulties at Life Management.  
 
I would be thankful if you would complete the attached questionnaires. Completion of the 
Young Schema Questionnaire, Inventory of Cognitive Distortions and the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale is expected to take about 20 minutes.  These surveys have been used 
in past research in psychology with no ill effects.  While there are no known or expected 
risks to participating in this study, there may be some emotional discomfort.  This 
discomfort is expected to be minimal and brief from completing the questionnaires about 
personal thoughts, feelings and psychological symptoms.   
 
Participation in this project is voluntary.  Furthermore, all information you provide will 
be confidential; you are not asked to put your name on any of the questionnaires.  If you 
choose to participate and you become concerned by your level of emotional discomfort, a 
toll-free hotline will be included with your packet that you may contact to assist you with 
support.   
 
If you would like to take part in this study, please return the completed questionnaires 
and keep this letter.  If after receiving this letter, you have any questions about this study, 
or would like more information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, 
please feel free to contact Dr. Robert DiTomasso at (215) 871-6511.  However, please 
know the final decision about participation is yours.  Should you have any comments or 
concerns resulting from your participation in this study, you can also contact PCOM’s 
Research Compliance Specialist at 215-871-6782.  Thank you for your interest in this 
project. 
 
Respectfully, 
 
Keith Milligan, MA, MS, LPC   Robert A. DiTomasso, PhD, ABPP 
Responsible Investigator                                            Chairman, PCOM Department of  
Psychology 
 
 
 
